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Introduction
The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America proclaims that 'all 
men are created equal', and from this all Americans are 'endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable Rights' including 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.'1 This 
document is a source of great pride for the nation because it serves as a reminder that 
America was the first nation founded on the idea that opportunity is for all. This has 
become encapsulated in the popular notion of the American Dream: owning a home and 
living comfortably while pursuing success through hard work and perseverance. This 
Dream invests effective power in the individual as the sole determinant of their fate and 
indicates the possibility of social mobility. This thesis is concerned with the fantasy of 
the American Dream and the debilitating psychological effect that this Dream functions 
to induce. Through a systematic theoretical and conceptual analysis of American 
capitalism, and the period of neoliberalism in particular, the thesis articulates the 
contours of subjectivity of American individuals. This thesis contends that the freedom 
offered by American capitalism is not substantive as freedom serves to undermine 
questions of power, and to dismiss structural constraints. Thus, this thesis seeks to 
define the structural and discursive factors which make this Dream a fantasy. 
The methodology of this project requires an engagement with several theories of 
political economy, philosophy and historical analysis. However, the line of reasoning 
developed throughout the thesis should be understood as an imaginary conversation 
between the seminal thinkers of structuralist and post-structuralist thought; Karl Marx 
and Michel Foucault. Marx would open, 'I'm right, I'm right, and I can prove it.' From 
which he would launch into a long, though eloquent, account of the objective factors 
involved in the creation of products, and the odd way in which this is disguised. He 
would conclude resoundingly that the American Dream is ideological, and call for a 
revolution of the working class accordingly. It takes no stretch of the imagination to 
construct an image of Foucault pondering Marx's impassioned soliloquy, hand to chin, 
nodding as if he agreed, before condemning the very certainty with which Marx invoked 
1 The Declaration of Independence. Available at, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/, 
(accessed: 30/09/2012).
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his claims. Foucault would suggest instead that 'ideology is analytically insufficient to 
understand the way power structures individual lives.'2 Foucault would mention the 
common sense, the norms and the accepted truths which serve to organise the lives of 
individuals, and thus indicate that the American Dream is more totalising than Marx 
would contend because power is diffuse.
Broadly, the disagreement between the work of these men is a consequence of the 
different premises with which each begins their thesis. This can be related to their 
intellectual and social milieu: modernity and emergent postmodernity. However it is the 
epistemological divide between them which is most jarring and thus must be the basis 
on which this imaginary debate is understood. This thesis is an attempt to interject into 
the debate between Marxist and Foucauldian scholars to make the tension between 
structuralist and post-structuralist thought productive. To be sure, the question of 
subjectivity is a distinctly post-structuralist field of research, however this thesis 
indicates that binding Marxist thought into post-structuralist analysis is crucial to 
understanding both the structural and discursive factors which produce subjectivity.
Structure
Because of the centrality of money in the American Dream, the thesis begins with a 
critical analysis of the common sense and theoretically dominant understanding of 
money which posits that money is a means of exchange. It outlines the historical 
construction and methodological assumptions of this functionalist understanding of 
money which is propounded by neoclassical economics. From this the chapter questions 
a Marxist explanation of money as a commodity fetish as a means to comprehend the 
hold neoclassical economics has over common sense. However, the epistemological 
basis of the term commodity fetish is critically considered because of its relation to 
ideology. This is a distinctly post-structuralist perspective and is important because it 
invests agency into individuals. The notion of ideology that I work with is not just 
cognitive but affects the individual on an emotional level. Through this use of qualified 
ideology, the chapter identifies that there is more to money than its functions and its 
2 The essence of this dialogue was taken from Paul Rabinow's conversation with Foucault documented 
in The Foucault Reader, (New York: Pantheon books, 1984).
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'objective' value. There is a secular belief in money. The chapter concludes that this 
belief is not individually determined and is systemically produced. This belief has not 
yet been properly analysed in critical sociological understandings of money. 
Accordingly, this is the mandate of chapter two.
To achieve an explanation of this secular belief, chapter two begins by recognising the 
historical relationship between capitalism and religion. This serves to identify that 
capitalism and religion are not only coexistent but constitute an amalgam. For this 
reason, the chapter indicates that belief is an inextricable part of capitalism. With this 
conceptual understanding, the chapter challenges the historical explanation of the 
secularisation of the twentieth century. We are used to thinking about secularisation as 
the decline of a higher authority or determining force but as the chapter shows, the 
secular period functions through power. It has affective force. The expression 'not-not a 
religion' is used to draw attention to this paradoxical nature of secular capitalism. An 
historical analysis of the expressive individualism of the 1960s is pursued through 
differing epistemological frames to expose the power imbued in the secular. This power 
is understood to exist through recognition of the anxiety that the freedom of the period 
induced. For this reason, anxiety is determined to be a productive part of modern 
capitalism. Thus this chapter is a systemic explanation of the anxious 'individual' under 
capitalism, which reveals the subject of capitalism. 
Chapters three and four place the insights of the previous chapters into the period of 
neoliberal capitalism which is associated with the late 1970s onwards. Chapter three is 
the empirical component of the thesis, drawing specifically on histories of the period 
preceding neoliberalism to indicate the complex rise of neoliberalism. This serves to 
challenge the common explanations of neoliberalism which indicate that it was merely 
the imposition of monetarist theory onto the American society. The chapter identifies 
that there was a burgeoning anti-government on both the Right and Left of politics. For 
this reason the realisation of neoliberalism should be understood as a much more 
emotional and affective process. The chapter indicates that stagflation served as the final 
turn against the Keynesian New Deal era, and freedom became the clarion call of the 
political Left and Right. This chapter finally indicates that the presidential candidate 
3
Ronald Reagan capitalised on this anti-government mood to implement a conservative 
agenda.
If freedom was the demand of the 1970s, the task of chapter four is to offer an 
explanation of why the idea of freedom continues to hold, despite the evident un-
freedoms of state expansion. The chapter claims that this contradiction was made 
functional through the continual recollection of the un-freedom of the 'other' –  the 
Soviet Union. Through this recollection freedom became inextricable from the free 
market. As such freedom for the individual came to mean consumption and choice, 
individual power and responsibility. The chapter analyses the concepts consumer 
sovereignty, human capital and ultimately the idea of the rational individual 
to indicate the discursive power of them. These concepts de-legitimise analysis of 
distributional fairness, and effective power, however the individual perpetuates these 
concepts through self government. Anxiety is suggested as a productive part of 
neoliberal capitalism because it spurs the individual to return to familiar forms of power 
for support. This indicates the paradoxical involvement of the individual in the process 
of subjectification. Philosopher Wendy Brown's notion of the 'plastic cage' is used as an 
analogy to consider the double process of subjectivity that neoliberalism has induced. 
Brown's analogy is insightful because it indicates a process that goes beyond an 
interaction of structure and agency, and thus presents a more totalising understanding of 
the affective power of neoliberalism. The chapter concludes paradoxically, that agency 
can be acquired through the recognition of this cage; knowing that there is no effective 
power in picking and choosing what is on offer. The chapter claims that individual 
agency arrives through the rejection of the 'democracy of choice' provided by neoliberal 
capitalism.
This thesis should not be understood as the removal of individual responsibility over 
their lives. On the contrary, this thesis suggests that through recognition of this double 
process of subjectivity the individual can become active through their discontent. This 
does not mean a demand for heightened state power to suppress these anxieties, as was 
the conclusion of the likes of Eric Fromm. Nor does it mean that people fear freedom, 
as Friedrich Hayek argued. The argument of this thesis is that neoliberal freedom does 
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not allow for substantive freedom, and the anxiety of this leads individuals to familiar 
sources of power. Thus, anxiety is a product of the system of capitalism. Anxiety has 
become more pervasive under neoliberal capitalism because of the heightened emphasis 
on individual responsibility. Through the line of reasoning outlined, there is potential for 
social change to rectify the subjectivity of anxiety and for this reason the thesis should 
be understood to be based on the premise of theoretical rigour, but also on hope. 
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Chapter 1
Is money is money is money?
Bread, cash, dosh, dough, loot, lucre, moolah, readies, 
the wherewithal: call it what you like, money matters.
Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money.
Money is a fact of modern life. It is the means by which individuals determine value, 
store value and buy and sell the goods that they require. Because of these functions it is 
possible to suggest that money makes modern life easier. But this functionalist 
understanding of money does not recognise the social power of money. In contemporary 
capitalism money is the means through which the American Dream is realised. Money 
means choice, opportunity and freedom. In this regard, money holds symbolic power. 
The question asked by this chapter, is how these two understandings exist side by side. 
To answer this question, the chapter is broken into three sections. The first section will 
identify the relationship between money as a means of exchange and the neoclassical 
school of economic theory. It will problematise the abstract construction of neoclassical 
economics during the nineteenth century, and question the purported 'scientific' basis of 
the school. However this methodological critique is limited in explaining the effective 
power of neoclassical theory. For this reason, section two considers the Marxist concept 
of commodity fetishism as a possible explanation of money and the production of value. 
The use of the term 'commodity fetish' is challenged on epistemological grounds 
because it suggests the false consciousness of individuals. This post-structuralist view is 
important because it goes to the heart of what the thesis is about; understanding 
subjectivity in capitalism. The third section applies the epistemologically qualified 
understanding of ideology to an analysis of a recent debate in critical sociology. This 
indicates that an understanding of money in capitalism requires an understanding of the 
subject by which it is used. Put in another way, money is a mere object without the 
values invested in its form by whom it is used. However those who use it exist within a 
complex array of social powers and structures which determines the values and beliefs 
that they invest in money. This chapter thus indicates that the question about money is 
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really a question about value and how and who determines value.
1.1  Construction of the neoclassical, removal of the social
The standard economic understanding of money is contained in the cumulative and 
complimentary work of  Carl Menger,  Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras and Knut 
Wicksell-- understood collectively as the neoclassical school. In their view, money can 
be understood functionally as 'money is, what money does'. For Wicksell, summarising 
the neoclassical position, we know through our own use of money that it is a means to 
measure value, holds the capacity to store value, and conveniently is a medium of 
exchange.3 But largely it is the last function that of a means of exchange, which is of 
most interest to neoclassical economics. The neoclassical economists indicate that for 
money to function as a means of exchange a generality of the monetary form is 
required. Wicksell indicates that money must be a 'commodity which is habitually, and 
without hesitation, taken by anybody in exchange for any commodity.'4 According to 
this view, there must be some common form that society collectively accepts, in order 
to allow exchange and transaction to occur. Without a common form individuals would 
trade one good for another and determine the value of that good subjectively, usually in 
recourse to the satisfaction or utility that it gives.5 
To explain the historical emergence of money, and simultaneously its common 
acceptance, neoclassical economists usually resort to a narrative about the village 
market and the myth of barter, where two individuals seek to trade their wares.6 Vivien 
has five chickens to sell and Barry has one cow. Vivien wants to trade the cow for her 
chickens but Barry is not interested. Despite Vivien's want for the cow there is little she 
can do, lest she finds someone with something that Barry wants, and trade this for her 
chickens, allowing the transaction to finally take place. This narrative indicates that 
barter is complicated if the incidences of wants do not intersect. There is also the 
problem of trading like-for-like, if Vivien has chickens and wants more of them, she 
3 Knut Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy, volume two, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 
1967), p6.
4 Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy, p17.
5 W Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Economics, (New york: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p49.
6 Geofrrey Ingham, 'Babylonian madness': on the historical and sociological origins of money, in What 
is money?, ed John Smithin, (London: Routledge, 2000), p17.
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would have to barter her chickens in order to gain more of them: a tautological but 
logical proposition within the neoclassical framework. Neoclassical economists thus 
suggest that the general monetary form developed as the 'spontaneous outcome' of 
individuals in society 'who have little by little worked their way to a discrimination of 
the different degrees of saleableness in commodities.'7 Further, they claim that 'money is 
a natural product of human economy.'8 Money is the necessary requirement for the 
smooth functioning of the market and more broadly, society. With this practical 
understanding, money becomes a mere tool, as though a neutral vehicle for exchange. 
This indicates that money is endogenous to the system of capitalism.9 Which is 
significant because it is expressed as common sense and is broadly taken as such. 
The development of the neoclassical school, and the cementation of its position as a 
'neutral, objective science' did not occur because the laws of economics were already 
written and awaiting discovery. The very word development exposes a process, and this 
process required the construction of strict disciplinary borders predicated on exclusion.10 
Thus, the drive to reach the heights of scientific rigour legitimated the removal of all the 
messy and contentious questions of political economy specifically inequality and 
distribution, under the blanket claim that they were 'un-scientific'. The sum of these 
'unscientific questions' were thrown out and reassembled into the discipline of 
sociology, which effectively constituted the sterilisation of the scientific laboratory. The 
political implications of this sterilised economics suggests that individuals function 
differently in different spheres of their lives:  homo economicus is completely rational, 
endowed with complete knowledge and foresight, while social man is the opposite. 
According to this analytical distinction, an intellectual division of labour between the 
disciplines emerged and the subject of money came under the rubric of economics. 
Money was understood to be 'not sociological enough'.11 This indicates that the 
sterilisation of political economy, through the removal of its social characteristics, also 
7 Carl Menger, On the Origin of Money, in Concepts of Money: Interdisciplinary perspectives from 
Economics, Sociology and Political Science, ed Geoffrey Ingham, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2005), p14.
8 Carl Menger, Principles of Economic, (Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p262.
9 Sheila Dow, The Methodology of Macroeconomic thought: a conceptual analysis of schools of  
thought in economics, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1996), p160.
10 Simon Clarke, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, (Macmillan, 1982). PDF. Available at, 
http://libcom.org/files/marx,%20marginalism%20and%20modern   %20sociology%20-%20clarke.pdf , 
p142.
11 Viviana Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p10
8
had the effect of stripping money of its political constitution. The importance of 
identifying this sterilisation is that the methodological construction of theory is exposed 
as a deeply political process.
The methodological assumptions of neoclassical economics hold that all individuals are 
rational and utility maximising, competition is consequently understood to be insatiable, 
and thus markets always reach a state of equilibrium.12 You will notice that in this 
construction, there is no room for money. As economic sociologist Geoffrey Ingham 
argues, money is only thrown into the neoclassical theoretical mix as some sort of 
(practical) afterthought. Accordingly, money is understood merely as an instrument to 
ensure the facilitation of the perfect market.13 Ingham observes that the tightness of this 
methodological construction indicates that no consideration can be given to the 
historical development and existence of social relations, or other functions of money 
such as the store of value, money of account and means of payment. Ingham argues that 
neoclassical economics 'divert's theoretical analysis away from fundamental questions 
about the social processes by which money is created'.14 Ingham is thus resounding in 
the call for the disqualification of neoclassical economics as the primary discipline for 
the investigation of money. He suggests the very existence of money provokes social 
questions, and must not be understood as a mere enabling vehicle.15 
Methodological critiques such as this are important because it indicates what 
neoclassical economics excludes. However Ingham's methodological critique does not 
strike at the heart of Walras' claim that economics is a science which can privilege its 
proofs over those of sociology, as neoclassical economics is already insulated from such 
a critique. In fact, methodological critiques cannot address what legitimates such 
theories, as methodological critiques serve to identify the assumptions upon which 
theory rests, and do not explain why such assumptions exist. All that economists have to 
say in response to such critiques, as Menger did, is that the laws of economics hold 'for 
an analytically or abstractly conceived economic world'.16 This indicates that 
12  Wicksell, Lectures on Political Economy, p19.
13 Ingham, 'Babylonian madness', p17.
14 Ingham, 'Babylonian madness', pp17-18.
15 Geoffrey Ingham, Money is a social relation, in Review of Social Economy, v.54, n.4, winter, 1996, 
p15.
16  Menger quoted in Simon Clarke, Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology, (Macmillan, 1982), 
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neoclassical economics represents the ideal to which the real world, and policies for the 
real world can be compared. But, neoclassical economics does hold an effective 
capacity over the complexity of society, precisely because it is applied to the complexity 
of society. The application of neoclassical economics is legitimated because the 
scientism associated with the school lends it credibility: because neoclassical economics 
is presented as objective truth. To address this 'scientism' it is necessary to use the 
insight generated from a methodological critique in order to infer neoclassical theory as 
ideological.
Ingham recognises ideology in regards to the forgetting of the state,17 which connects 
his line of argument with the Chartalist school of history commonly associated with 
Keynesian economic theory.18 We need only look at the symbols on the notes and coins 
we use, to recognise that the state plays a role in the creation of money. But rather than 
engaging in a jostling match between the Chartalist and neoclassical schools, we must 
question whether there is something else before the 'forgetting' of the state that serves to 
create value. To be sure, money exists in societies defined by inequality. Regardless of 
an individual's position, money is understood in the same way, as though it is the most 
objective fact of life. This is exactly the sort of understanding that neoclassical 
economics enacts through the focus on exchange sans distribution. Neoclassical 
economics holds objectivity because it forces a 'forgetting' of everything else associated 
with the production of value, as the methodological limits allow no analysis beyond 
what it identifies. In this sense, neoclassical economics creates constructed truths which 
hold effective power and further becomes accepted as unquestionable common sense. 
1.2  Ideology, epistemology and critique
Karl Marx's idea of the commodity fetish is introduced here in order to explore the 
possible ideological quality of money. I then challenge this insight by invoking a 
Foucauldian epistemological critique which identifies the insufficiency of ideology as a 
means by which to understand power. From this critique a marriage between the two 
p143.
17 Ingham, 'Babylonian madness', p30.
18 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money, The Pure Theory of Money, (London: Macmillan and Co, 
1935), p11.
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opposing schools of thought can be formed.
Marx based his understanding of money on a theoretical critique of the classical 
political economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who focused on the moment of 
exchange. This means that he developed his understanding of money prior to the 
emergence of the neoclassical school. Despite this fact, his insight applies to the 
neoclassical understanding, because of the absolute focus neoclassical economics has on 
exchange. Marx developed the term commodity fetishism to explain the odd way in 
which  money conceals the alienation inherent in capitalism. To Marx, money is the 
essence of private property, but it appears as if it is not, thus the 'fetish'.19 Marx 
explained that because capitalist society sanctions private property, there is a divide 
between those who have and those who have not. It is those who have not (who he 
deemed the working class) that produce value in society. 
Marx argued that because this value is only realised through the exchange process under 
capitalism, value is alienated as there is a disconnect between labour value and 
exchange value.20 Put in another way, value becomes detached from the (labour) value 
congealed within it, and thus appears to be an independent vehicle. What Marx strove to 
identify was that the production of value dissolves through exchange; accordingly the 
social relations required for this production disappear. Through the process of exchange, 
value appears as the expression of the intersecting wants of individuals, and thus holds 
no consideration of anything that came before the moment of exchange. This is more 
than a methodological critique, because Marx indicates how this understanding of 
objectivity is accepted in society. Thus, to Marx, money is ideological because it 
conceals the social relations which produce products and then allows for exchange. If 
money is understood as devoid of labour value, it acquires an undue objectivity and 
power, and people use money as if it is just a means of exchange. 
Marx claimed that commodity fetishism is 'not simply a subjective or superficial 
appearance of real relations, it is an objectively occurring and necessary aspect of those 
19 A fetish can be understood as the attribution of mystical or religious qualities to an inanimate object. 
In this case, investing money with power it does not inherently hold.
20 Karl Marx, The fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof. Available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4, (accessed: 25/06/2012).
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social relations.'21 This indicates that the objective relations of capitalism will always 
create this fetishism. Accordingly, Marx contended that false consciousness is the 
standard mental state of the working class under market relations, rather than the 
exception to it. Because of this recognition, Marx claimed that the only means by which 
to overcome false consciousness and acquire true consciousness is the revolution of the 
working class. It would follow that the material conditions of living must degrade to 
such a low standard that the working class will revolt, and through this revolt recognise 
the inherent injustice of the capitalist system. Within the structural framework offered 
by Marx this makes theoretical sense. However, this sort of teleological explanation of 
history serves to deny individuals agency and further disregards the complexity of the 
social reality in which individuals exist. To remove the teleology that he inscribes, it is 
necessary to step outside his epistemological frame which is dependent on historical 
materialism. This is possible by engaging post-structuralist thought.
It is the early work of Michel Foucault The Order of Things and The Archaeology of  
Knowledge  which most cogently expresses an epistemological critique of ideology, the 
mother concept of commodity fetishism. Foucault indicated that his resistance to the 
concept of ideology rested on three bases: 
the first is that ... it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which 
is supposed to count as truth ... The second drawback is that the concept of 
ideology refers ... to something of the order of a subject. Third, ideology stands 
in secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, 
as its material, economic determinant.22
The combination of these points can be understood as a challenge to positivism, and the 
dominance that it held in academic thought. It is therefore a challenge to certainty. 
However, it must necessarily be understood as a specific and pointed attack on Marxism 
as a mode of critical inquiry, and thus holds politically destabilising intent. Through this 
destabilisation of common thought, Foucault opened critical intellectual spaces which 
enabled recognition of the construction of objective reason, knowledge and thought. To 
understand the ingenuity of this insight, it is useful to draw upon the analogy of 
21 Karl Marx quoted in Anrita Nelson, Marx's Concept of Money: The God of Commodities, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1999), p143. 
22 Michele Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed Paul Rabinow, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p60.
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removing a pair of sunglasses, which enables one to see the world in a new and more 
nuanced light. To Foucault there is no objective position because all positions contain a 
connection to some other, presupposed understanding.23 The basic point of Foucault's 
position is that all thought presupposes something. Thus all thought must be 
investigated, and not held with absolute certainty. In place of ideology, Foucault offered 
episteme as the epistemological neutral means by which to analyse and describe the 
totality of power,24 with discourse being his tool of analysis.
In making this claim Foucault infers that he has been able to extricate himself from the 
totality of the episteme, as if he is some omnipotent critical thinker who is unrestrained 
by the limits he describes. Philosopher Michael Walzer argued that contrary to this, the 
strategic knowledge that Foucault claims to offer 'implies … a coherent view of reality 
and a sense of purpose.'25 Thus to Walzer, Foucault's refusal to take a position, beyond 
describing a historical moment, makes the knowledge he produces disturbing in so far 
as it does nothing, and cannot do anything. To Walzer, Foucauldian thought serves to 
legitimate the status quo.26 This is an opinion shared in some circles of the academic 
Left, however Foucauldian thought remains the standard of progressive thought and 
thus the dismissal of ideology largely holds.27 However, as Fabio Vighi and Heiko 
Feldner argue for all the powerful descriptions the Foucauldian approach provides it:
has left us clueless as to how to get out of this hermetic universe of self 
enclosed discourses, powers and counter powers ... all we can do... is to 
describe the workings of discourse ... and feel encouraged by the fact that 
what we are facing is merely a performatively enacted, historically 
contingent setting which might have been, and thus could be, utterly 
different.28
To be sure, accepting the epistemological critique offered by Foucault, we become 
mired in a reality with no chance of escape in fear that we may presuppose and thus 
misdiagnose the ills of society. However, recognising the apparent fatalism of Foucault 
23 Michele Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (London: Tavistock publications, 1982), p191.
24  Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge,  p186.
25 Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michele Foucault, in Foucault: a critical reader, ed David Couzen 
Hoy, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p51.
26 Walzer, The Politics of Michele Foucault, p67.
27 Take for example Nikolas Rose, Paul Rabinow, James Faubion and the journal Economy and Society. 
28 Fabio Vighi, (and Heiko Felder), Ideology Critique of Discourse Analysis?: Zizek against Foucault, in 
European Journal of Political Theory, v.6, n.2, 2007, April, p153.
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should not encourage a dismissal of his work. It is important to understand why he 
developed in this way to then recognise why he was so resistant to classical Marxist 
notions of ideology.
 It is with only a cursory glance at the history of the 1960s that the reasons for 
Foucault's resistance to Marxist thought comes to light. It was within the bi-polar 
context of the Cold war that Foucault asked bluntly 'what on earth could politics 
represent when it is a matter of choosing between the America of Truman or the USSR 
of Stalin?'29 This lacuna in politics led Foucault to develop theoretical knowledge that 
was deliberately fragmentary and offered no coherent strategy. He argued that any 
'attempt to give an overall account of human society will lead to oppression, not 
liberation.'30 Thus it was not a gap in politics which he identified, but the devastating 
conclusion that holding onto knowledge with absolute certainty leads to destruction. He 
rejected the determinism, the essentialism and reductionism of Stalinist Marxism. But 
such a critique is not the sole domain of post-structuralist thought. Contemporary 
Marxist scholars denounce structuralism of this ilk, as it offers little and wrests agency 
from the hands and minds of individuals, presenting them as drones of class.31 In this 
regard, it is important to recognise the conflation made by Foucault, in regards to 
structuralist thought. To deem ideology an antiquated concept void of meaning and 
explanatory power, remedies exploitative situations, history and ideas as terminal, and 
thus renders change impossible.
It is in recognition of the fatalism of Foucauldian thought and the need to overcome the 
determinism of Marxist thought, that the following section attempts to paradoxically 
knit together Foucauldian and Marxist thought, in order to create a nuanced, more 
fleshed out, responsive understanding of ideology. This combination does not dismiss 
the insights generated by Foucault, but uses them to enable a better understanding of 
how power functions immanently, not just externally and thus enriches the Marxist 
account. The recognition that power does not emanate from a known position but 
29 Michele Foucault quoted in Colin Wilson, Michel Foucault: friend or foe of the left, in International  
Socialism: A quarterly journal of socialist theory, issue 118, March 2008. Available at, 
http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=431, (accessed: 20/09/2012).
30 Foucault quoted in Wilson, Michel Foucault. Available at, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=431, (accessed: 
20/09/2012).
31 The prime example here is the Frankfurt School of Critical theory.
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through norms and beliefs exposes a new avenue for understanding the use of money 
within capitalism. This suggests that money can neither be understood without the 
system by which it is used, nor without the individuals within this system. It is to look 
again at how best to understand the individual's acceptance of money, without denying 
the agency they hold. But in investing the individual with agency it must continually be 
recalled that power remains to exist. 
It is in search of this sort of paradoxical combination that one necessarily stages an 
encounter with Slavoj Zizek's text, The Sublime Object of Ideology. Zizek's 
understanding is determined through a commitment to Lacanian psychoanalysis, which 
enables him to reject the determinism and reductionism that Foucault so cogently 
decried of (Stalinist) Marxism without reverting to Foucault's epistemological 
posturing, and thus his impotent strategic conclusions. Zizek claims that ideology is not 
an illusion, as classical Marxists claim, but a fantasy.32 He explains that fantasy is 
different to an illusion because it 'structures our effective social relations and thereby 
masks some unsupportable, real, impossible kernel.'33 Thus, the fantasy of reality is 
specifically not illusory because we exist within it, and are affected by it. It  does not 
occur in the mind or constitute a 'thought abstraction'.34 Instead, the fantasy is 
functional. This is significant because it does not deny individuals agency or suggest 
false consciousness and recognises the individual's involvement in the process of reality. 
Zizek claims that this understanding of fantasy explains the way that individuals within 
capitalism use money. He suggests that using money is like the fetishistic disavowal, 'I 
know that money is a material object like others, but still ... (it is as if  it were made of a 
special substance over which time has no power).'35 This differs from classical Marxist 
thought because individuals know what is going on. With this recognition of 'knowing' 
Zizek reveals that individuals are more involved in the process of subordination than 
Marxists would suggest. Zizek invests individuals, and more specifically the working 
class, with a philosophical agency. This idea is important because it contains Foucault's 
epistemological critique and thus enables the concept of commodity fetishism to hold in 
32 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, eight edition (London: Verson, 1999), p36.
33 Slavoj Zizek quoted in David Couzen Hoy, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-
Critique, (London and New York: The MIT press, 2004), p218.
34 Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology,  p19.
35 Ibid, p18.
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a qualified sense. 
But this recognition of philosophical agency provokes a question: if it is known that 
money is merely an oppressive object, why is it still used? Certainly the basic answer to 
this is a material one: we need money to buy the goods to survive and live. But there is 
an explanation beyond this material need and it is in answering this question that Zizek 
shifts further away from classical Marxist thought. He suggests that at the base of the 
fantasy is a system of beliefs which precedes our own recognition. Importantly, he 
suggests that these beliefs are 'radically exterior'.36 They are beliefs which are embodied, 
and not of ourselves. He says we believe 'because we have found sufficient good 
reasons to believe ... we find reasons attesting our belief because we already believe.'37 
What Zizek suggests is a double process in which individuals are bound within a certain 
way of knowing, which is believed to be of their own making because of their 
experience, and another process in which this thought has already been determined 
through the layers of historical circumstance. Such philosophical posturing connects 
with Foucault's understanding of the episteme and serves to bring further nuance to 
Zizek's work. With Zizek's understanding of fantasy as opposed to illusion, the concept 
of ideology becomes flexible because it recognises the interrelationship of agency, 
discourse and structure. 
1.3 How the contemporary debate meets the fantasy 
This section explores a recent debate in the sociology of money. The conclusion of this 
debate is problematised through an understanding of the fantasy. This indicates money 
as icon.
The 1994 publication of Viviana Zelizer's work The Social Meaning of Money caused a 
minor furore in the sociology of money. Zelizer argued that rather than 'a neutral veil'38, 
36 Ibid,  p19.
37 Zizek quoted in Hoy, Critical Resistance, p219.
38 Wicksell quoted in Ingham, 'Babylonian madness', p17
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'colourless'39 or a 'radical leveller',40 money is special and gains character through 
circulation, mutilation and earmarking. Zelizer made a case for understanding money as 
heterogenous and thus argued against any theory which indicated the generality of 
money. She suggested that 'values and social relations reciprocally transmute money by 
investing it with meaning and social patterns'.41 For example, she notes how stolen 
money will be used differently to money given as a gift, or money deemed to be dirty 
will be spent with speed, whereas money that is worked for will be spent with caution.42 
With this she attempted to nullify the argument that money is objective, and prove it as 
a socially heterogenous process.43 In fact, Zelizer's thesis contended that even speaking 
of money through the singular noun was false because of the many ways in which 
'monies' are made particular. This was not a methodological critique to which scholars 
of money could respond with minor changes around the edges of theory. It was a total 
argument. The heresy of this argument was not that she dismissed all prior knowledge 
but because she mounted an attack on the capacity to theorise altogether.
The intellectual cogency of Zelizer's work rests in the empirical evidence she accrued. 
As much as monetary theorists sought to dismiss her work as sociological claptrap, they 
could not evade the evidence which attested her thesis. Her work had to be engaged 
with in order to contain the implications of it, and in this regard Zelizer's thesis was a 
stain which could not be washed clean. Perhaps the most notable critique was that 
offered by the Marxist political economists Costas Lapavitsas and Ben Fine. They 
argued that in Zelizer's effort to understand 'monies' and recognise the multiplicity of its 
forms, she had ignored the generality of it. They suggested 'that multiplicity is itself a 
consequence of the common content of markets and money', and specifically that 
'economic factors have to be understood prior to, and precisely in order to facilitate 
analysis of, broadly defined and scattered social, cultural and historical factors.'44 This 
39 George Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, second edition, 
(New York: Routledge, 1990), p387.
40 Marx quoted in Viviana Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 
p17
41 Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, pp17-18.
42 Viviana Zelizer, Interview with Radio Australia, June 1998. Available at, 
http://www.abc.net.au/money/vault/extras/extra1.htm  ,   (accessed: 15/07/2012).
43 Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money,  pp24-25.
44 Ben Fine, (and Costas Lapavitsas), Markets and money in social theory: what role for economics?, in 
Economy and Society, v.29, n.3, August 2000, p124.
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suggests that money, whatever the form, must be understood through the system by 
which it is produced. This is compelling because it recognises that money is an object 
that is invested with value and power through the social and economic milieu that it is 
created. What should be taken from this critique of Zelizer is that money is a systemic 
tool and thus contains the foundations of the system in which it is used. 
In her response Zelizer derided Lapavitsas and Fine for imposing a Marxist political 
bias on empirical studies. But, and most interestingly, she agreed that there is no 
existing contradiction between uniformity and diversity, 'it is simply two different 
aspects of the same transaction... actors adopt universalizing modes and particularising 
markets.'45 In this way, rather than understanding money as either purely general, or 
absolutely particular, it can be understood as dual: holding the capacity to do both things 
simultaneously. She provided the example of the ability of people to 'speak English in a 
recognisably grammatical way at the same time that they pour individual and personal 
content into their conversations.'46 With this response she appeared to close the debate 
about money. But with the claim of duality Zelizer effectively enabled any theory of 
money to develop so long as it recognised this duality. Thus, despite the apparent 
conclusion, one must question whether the methodological pluralism enabled by this 
understanding is possible, and one must further question the politics of this pluralism.
Political economist Martijn Konings indicates that the suggestion of duality lacks 
explanatory power because 'it is extremely difficult to understand standardisation and 
differentiation as different sides of the same coin.'47 He suggests that rather 'what we 
have... is not a simple duality but an actual paradox.'48 Konings argues that to 
understand this paradox it is important to turn against the intellectual muddle of money 
and instead to consider the daily experience of money, the meaning of which 'is readily 
available to us on a practical, intuitive level.'49 What my daily practical experience of 
45 Viviana Zelizer, Fine Tuning the Zelizer View, in Economy and Society, v.29, n.3, 2000, p386
46 Zelizer, Fine Tuning the Zelizer view, p386.
47 Martijn Konings, Money as Icon, in Theory and Event, v.14, n.3, 2011, 
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/journals/theory_and_event/v014/14.3.konings.html 
(accessed: 02/05/2012).
48 Konings, Money as Icon, 
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/journals/theory_and_event/v014/14.3.konings.html, 
(accessed: 02/05/2012).
49 Ibid.
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money tells me is that money is a medium of exchange, store of value and measure of 
value, which is exactly what neoclassical economics suggests and progressive monetary 
theorists including myself have resolutely thrown out. But, Konings identifies that there 
is more to money than these functions. In contemporary capitalism money symbolises 
social power, wealth and possibility. He identifies that the denial of this social power is 
not so much a 'meaningful personal belief or a potentially effective attempt to resist the 
lure of a fetish, but rather the inability or reluctance to recognise a social fact.'50 This 
indicates that there is more to the process of understanding money than merely a 
cognitive, mental and individual understanding: there is an affective quality to it which 
is determined in society. 
For this reason, Konings argues that money should be understood as an icon. He 
indicates that this enables one to sidestep the problems associated with the suggestion of 
the fetish, because icons 'speak to us in a very direct way'.51 Konings identifies that as 
individuals we are not purely functional beings, we are also visceral and visual and gain 
meaning because of the associations which are made through symbols. Through this 
understanding, the belief in money is not a thought abstraction, but rather due to the 
system of symbols which evokes meaning and emotions. We understand money 
intuitively, despite the fact that the symbolic associations and narratives made are not 
inherent in the object of money, nor written into law. By identifying the iconic nature of 
money, Konings indicates that there is some form of faith or belief which allows the 
continual operation of money. He suggests that this belief can be understood to be a 
'distinctly modern, secularised kind.'52 It follows then that we use money because we 
believe in it, and we believe in it because of this already understood and unquestioned 
belief: money is money, and money is power. In this regard, it becomes self-reinforcing. 
It is with this suggestion of the systemic construction of meaning through symbols and 
associations that we come into contact with the radical, external belief of which Zizek 
was speaking. This suggests that our belief in money is not of us, but outside of us, and 
is determined through the system in which we reside. The end point of this argument is 
not to call for the dethroning of the King through the abolition of money, because this 
50 Ibid..
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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does not address the systemic creation of money and thus cannot remove the aspirations 
and associations of power that it elicits. Rather identification of a belief in money 
encourages a quest to understand this belief, and to identify from where it arises. This is 
no simple question. It asks what guides individuals? And from this, what constrains us? 
♦
This chapter has explored the common explanation of money by the neoclassical school 
of economic thought, which suggests simply that money is what money does. The 
argument of this chapter indicates that the methodological tightness of this theory 
prohibits an understanding of the social questions provoked by money. However it is 
through an ideological critique of this position that a more insightful understanding of 
the historical construction of money is gained. Ideology is further queried as the best 
means by which to gauge the characteristic of money through an epistemological 
critique of Marxist thought. In this regard, this chapter presents the beginning of the 
tension between Marxist and Foucauldian thought. It concludes that there is a belief 
associated with money to which current sociological debates of money have only 
alluded. This chapter is thus the first step towards uncovering the belief behind the 
American Dream. The next chapter will offer an explanation of this belief through a 
conceptual analysis of secularisation in the twentieth century.
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Chapter 2 
Problematising (secular) belief
This chapter explores the secular belief associated with money. To achieve this requires 
an acknowledgement of the process of secularisation, and to understand secularisation it 
is necessary to acknowledge what came before it. This position is reached through an 
understanding of the relationship between the economy and religion identified by Max 
Weber in his seminal work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. From this 
understanding, the chapter offers a critical engagement with Daniel Bell's work The 
Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism to challenge the common understanding of 
secularisation. The chapter indicates that there are ontological limits to secular capitalist 
society. Furthermore, the secular ontology of modern capitalism births an epistemology. 
This suggests that the way we know and think we know, the way we speak and the 
thoughts we have, are dependent on what exists. This chapter serves to birth a re-
reading of modern history, capitalism in general and human consciousness in particular. 
This suggests that individual freedom is not absolute, nor is it achievable. Thus an 
understanding of secular belief indicates a possible conclusion to the general 
problematic of subjectivity under neoliberal capitalism. 
2.1  Weber's insight: theology within the economy
In his seminal work, The Protestant ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber 
identified that the relationship between capitalism and religion developed during the 
upheaval of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. During this time an individual's 
'calling'53 shifted from an unalterable position set by God, to something which could be 
chosen specifically to please God.54 Weber identified that the limits of religion had 
expanded to enable pursuits which had been against the traditional understanding of a 
religious calling. For example, the making of money gained a sheen of religious 
53 In the preface to Weber's work R.H Tawney writes that a calling is 'the state of life in which the 
individual had been set by Heaven.' p2.
54 R.H Tawney, Preface, in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, seventh 
impression, translated by Talcot Parsons, (London: Unwin University books, 1965), p2.
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propriety so long as it was in the name of God. This meant that wealth was only 
sacrilegious if 'it is a temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life ... But as a 
performance of a duty in a calling it is not only morally permissible, but usually 
enjoined.'55 Weber held that this carried a pardon of, and further generated a belief in the 
'self made man', thus enabling the expectation that social mobility was possible. The 
effect of this expectation was that those unable to procure wealth were understood as 
lazy and sloth-like, as if it was a failing of themselves, and a failing before God. Weber 
identified that such societal pressure functioned to induce a sense of guilt which spurred 
people to work harder to rid themselves of this failing.56 This is important because it 
indicates the discursive power of religious morality to effect individuals to change 
behaviour to please God. Weber highlighted that those taken in by this ethic were 'not 
the real leaders, and especially not the permanently successful entrepreneurs',57 but the 
lower middle classes. With this argument he inferred an ideological characteristic to the 
Protestant work ethic. The ultimate suggestion of Weber's thesis was that, through the 
rationalisation and bureaucratisation begun by this ethic, society becomes an 'iron cage'. 
This indicated that the end result of the Protestant ethic was the suppression of human 
creativity and thus closed the possibility for change. 
Weber's thesis has been a point of major debate within the disciplines of sociology, 
theology and history since its publication in 1904. As David Little noted, the sum of 
these critiques can be broken into the failure 'to assess correctly the causes, content and 
implications of Puritanism.'58 So fierce and insatiable are these critiques that one could 
suggest that they are akin to a group of vultures picking at a long dead carcass.59 
However, this image does not recognise the hoard of academics who have defended 
Weber's insight.60 Despite no real conclusion to the debate, the length of the debate is 
indicative of the importance of the question he raised: 'to what extent (have) religious 
forces ... taken part in the qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of that 
(capitalist) spirit over the world.'61 To be sure, it is analytically necessary to speak as if 
55 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p163.
56 Ibid, p60.
57 Ibid, p71.
58 David Little, Max Weber Revisited: The “Protestant Ethic” and the Puritan Experience of Order, in 
Harvard Theological Review, 59, 1966, p415.
59 Examples of this include R.H Tawney (1937), Michael Walzer (1963), Gordan Marshall (1993).
60 Examples of this include George Albee (1977), David Little (1966) , Wallace M Davis (1978).
61 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,  p91.
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the economy and theology are distinct entities, however, the nuance of Weber's thesis is 
that he recognised the inextricability of the religious ethic and capitalist spirit. This 
indicates that theology is not external from the economy: it is bound to it. Thus any 
consideration of why individuals function in a certain way under capitalism requires an 
understanding of what they believe. This enables the larger question of why they 
believe. This point serves to encourage the line of reasoning already proposed in chapter 
one, as it indicates that the capitalist spirit of accruing money is not merely functional 
and in fact holds a moral base. The task of this chapter is to identify what this base is in 
secular capitalism. The questions which guide us into the next section are: how can 
capitalism be understood without religion? What is the ethos of secular capitalism? To 
answer these questions it is necessary to first challenge the common story of 
secularisation. 
2.2  Challenging the common story
The history of the twentieth century is often defined by the intertwined processes of 
modernity and secularisation, whereby the strictures of tradition were removed as 
industrialisation advanced. It is commonly argued that this process stripped individuals 
bare, enabling them to express their inner most desires, uninhibited by belief in a higher 
authority. Modern scholars such as George Albee, Christopher Lasch and Daniel Bell 
have contended that this has led to a society defined by 'inner-directedness',62 
narcissism,63 and hedonism.64 The suggestions of these scholars hold some traction as 
life is not about working hard to gain money in the name of some higher being, but 
working hard for oneself, for one's family, for social power and for prestige. However, 
by accepting this argument, one invests absolute power in the development of 
capitalism, imbuing the forces of production with some demystifying capacity, as if 
there is a negative relation between belief in religion and growth in industry. 
Bell's work The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism will be used exclusively because 
62 George Albee, The Protestant Ethic, Sex and Psychotherapy, in American Psychologist, volume 32, 
number 2, 1977, p160.
63 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in the Age of Diminishing Expectations,  
(New York: Norton, 1979), p7.
64  Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, (London: Heinemann, 1976),  p21.
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of the intuitive take his thought has in common thought. Bell posits, with the same 
certainty as waves crashing on a shore, that capitalism smashed through the permanence 
of the Protestant ethic, because mass production required mass consumption. Bell 
argues that the enchantment of the world dissolved and accordingly the epistemology of 
modern era became based on the rationality and reason of the 'self determining man'.65 
To put it plainly, seeing became the basis of belief. Holding this assumption of 
rationality and reason to be the foundation of modern society Bell claims that capitalism 
enacted a process of unbinding, in which individuals were emancipated from the self-
repressive mode of religiosity, and from this they were able to pursue individuation (and 
enjoyment) through consumption.66 Bell thus associates individualism with rationality, 
but ultimately presents this as selfishness. His argument suggests that the religious 
limits which dictated how life should be led were removed by capitalism's advancement, 
leaving modernity limitless and individuals no more than hedonistic unbelievers.67 Bell's 
argument infers that the individual in capitalism is defined by freedom.
Bell's concern with this modern society centres on the relationship between limits and 
meaning. He suggests that through limits meaning is understood, and meaning shapes 
the way people relate themselves to the world.68 His argument follows this schema: 
belief in a religion, religion has moral limits, and these limits provide meaning as 
people push against them and move through life. Accordingly, 'the lack of a 
transcendental tie, the sense that a society fails to provide some set of “ultimate 
meanings” in its character structure, work, and culture, becomes unsettling in a 
system.'69  Bell's argument infers that as individuals we need something in which to 
believe, to set limits, to gain meaning, so as to exist. Without such limits, society 
becomes a flock of sheep without a shepherd, eventuating in lost and wandering souls. 
Bell points to the 1960s70 as the era of shaking finality of belief, the point of most 
resistance to a religious past and acceptance of the secular world, the meaning-less. 
65 Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, p16.
66 Ibid, p21.
67 Ibid, p21.
68 Ibid, p146.
69 Ibid, p21.
70 The 1960s will be used throughout the thesis to express the radicalism of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In this regard it is a conceptual understanding of a period of time, rather than a strict 
understanding of time. 
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Images of the 1960s are still prevalent and accessible in contemporary society: self love, 
free love, independence. The 1960s were a rebellion against how things were and how 
they would continue to be. In a word, freedom.71 However, what Bell sees in this is not 
freedom, but a society occasioned by deep anxiety, fostered by a constant search for 
meaning. To explain this anxiety he employs the dialectic of release and restraint which 
he suggests correspond to the secular and religious respectively. He argues that the 
limits of religion, the restraint of them, provide the basis on which to exist without 
questioning meaning. Basically, people lived their lives understanding their position in 
the world and thus could set expectations about that life, and gain meaning 
accordingly.72 To understand this concept we need only recall the guilt which Weber 
identified which was induced when individuals could not obtain the heights of success 
that 'the calling' dictated. This was a moral limit, which spurred individuals to change 
their behaviour to please God. But if, as Bell suggests, restraint is the only basis by 
which to gain meaning through life, then the inference is that secularisation expanded 
the possible attainment of meaning to an impossibility, because it holds no limits, no 
guide to human functioning. In this regard the subject of capitalism is free, but 
perpetually anxious. 
Bell understands the release of the modern period to be listless and un-dynamic because 
there is no tension and no limits against which to push.73 But, importantly for the 
coherence of his argument, this slack does not quell the individual's desire to gain 
meaning, and consequently fosters a process of deep introspection and probing, taking 
individuals deeper and deeper into something which cannot appease them. All that it can 
produce is an 'aesthetic justification ... of life',74 in which individuals gain meaning 
through culture. Bell says forebodingly:
this endless life without fulfilment, is only a recipe for tragedy or black  
comedy. There is only the constant search for new interests, new pastimes, new 
sensations, new adventures, new revels, new revolutions, new joys, new terrors, 
new...75 
71 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: years of hope, days of rage, (Toronto, New york, London, Sydney and 
Auckland: Bantam Books, 1987), p3.
72 Eric Fromm, Escape from Freedom, (New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, inc, 1941), p101.
73 Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, p19.
74 Ibid, p156.
75 Ibid, p161.
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Through this statement, Bell makes the resounding claim that the unchecked drive of 
capitalism has led to a spiritual crisis for individuals, bringing society to the brink of 
nihilism.76 In this sense, his work is an exacting moral condemnation of contemporary 
society, encased in a teleology of capitalism.
Certainly the simple recognition of the continued existence of religions throughout the 
world halts the teleological drive of Bell's reasoning. In fact contrary to Bell's argument, 
research indicates that the United States was marked by a theological revival in the 
1960s.77 This research further differentiates between religious faith and religious culture 
to show the width and varying depth of Protestantism, not the non-existence of it.78 This 
point should be stressed, because it identifies that not only were the 1960s characterised 
by the maintenance of religious belief but that there was in fact a revival of religious 
belief. Bell is unable to explain this in his teleological schema as he connects 
secularisation solely with the industrialisation process. Even R.H Tawney's basic point 
that the religious and the secular sit side by side serves little purpose in understanding 
the revival of religious belief of the period. With this, it must be understood that the 
process of secularisation 'begun' by industrialisation was not as complete and totalising 
as Bell would indicate. 
Further, connecting this secularisation process with industrialisation alone fails to 
recognise the active voices of the Enlightenment who advocated the secularisation of 
the state, defined as secularism. Hypothetically, Bell could contend that the 
Enlightenment itself is a consequence of industrialisation. But such a suggestion would 
expose the construction of history as a narrative based project which does not seek to 
express fact but to create myth.79 It is widely understood that the Enlightenment period 
began in the mid eighteenth century before industrialisation began. In this regard the 
Enlightenment epistemology of individual rationality and reason guided this demand for 
secularism. Enlightenment scholars such as William Kingdon Clifford asked, if I cannot 
76 Ibid, p28
77 Andrew Finstuen, Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, Billy 
Graham, and Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2009),  pp7-8
78 Finstuen, Original Sin and Everyday Protestants, p14.
79 Paul Ricour, History and Truth, (Illinois: Northwestern University press, 1998), p xiv.
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see or touch this religion, how can it be proven to exist?80 Therefore, why should 
religion be the guide of government? In contemporary Western society this sort of 
argument seems to be a given. 
2.3  Ideology, epistemology and critique (again)
The following section outlines the superficiality of the Enlightenment argument through 
an historical materialist analysis. A Foucauldian critique will be applied to this, through 
an analysis of the expressive individualism of the 1960s. Thereby indicating that power 
is not removed from secular individualism. 
The argument developed by Karl Marx challenged the Enlightenment critique of 
religion through a commitment to an historical materialist analysis. This historical 
materialist framework offered insight into the reason for the development of religion 
and thus a clear vision of how to dissolve it. Marx argued that the active process of 
removing the church from the state was insufficient to ensure human emancipation from 
the 'illusory sun of religion'.81 While the state becomes free through this process, 
religious man simply becomes 'private man'. Marx articulated that secularism 
constitutes the closeting of religious faith, not the emancipation from it.82 In this regard, 
he offered a foundational critique of religion with the stated intention of overcoming it.
Marx made this argument on the basis that the consciousness of man was determined 
within the material conditions of life. In this regard, religion was man made. He argued 
that a belief in something bigger than oneself, something outside the material world, 
indicated that the hardship of life required this belief as a form of respite from reality. 
He explained that:
Religious suffering is at the same time the expression of real suffering and the 
protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the 
80 Kelly James Clark, Religious Epistemology. Available at, http://www.iep.utm.edu/relig-ep/ ,  (accessed: 
30/09/2012).
81 Karl Marx quoted in Alberto Toscano, Beyond Abstraction: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of 
Religion, in Historical Materialism, v.18, n.1, 2010, p18.
82 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question. Available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/  ,  (accessed: 20/07/2012).
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opium of the people.83 
This quote indicates that Marx's work was not an attack on religion per se, but on the 
system which produces suffering and requires an illusion to appease it. Under this 
reasoning, the danger of the Enlightenment demand was that it did not attack the 
material cause of religious illusion, would not lift its induced haze and thus would not 
dissolve the real religiousness of man.84 To Marx, the Enlightenment demand ensures 
the perpetuation of the belief in religion, as the need for an illusion remains because the 
social relations of capitalism remain definitive. It was, as Alberto Toscano has noted, 'a 
detour or a cloak for real political struggle'.85 In this sense the Enlightenment critique of 
religion is akin to the methodological critique of neoclassical economics outlined in 
chapter one. The Enlightenment critique of religion identifies the problem of religion, 
however it does not offer a critique which seeks to dissolve religion. Thus through a 
historical materialist approach Marx exposed the weakness of the Enlightenment 
epistemology independent of historical consideration. 
 Marx reasoned that 'true secularisation... can only be achieved through … overcoming 
of the liberal-secular state' in which the natural rights of man (and woman) are 
understood beyond the ambit of private property and within the realm of human need.86 
He argued that a working class revolution leading towards a socialist future was the 
only means by which to remove the cloak of illusion and allow true consciousness to be 
realised. Perhaps because of the radicalism of this argument, his vision of 'true 
secularisation' did not succeed, and the Enlightenment demand to separate church and 
state was undertaken. If the basis of Marx's reasoning is accepted, the process and end 
point of the Enlightenment secularisation held (and continues to hold) limits to the 
potential for ontological change. As the removal of religion concretises the political 
liberal narrative as natural, and the suffering of the working class remains. Marx 
contends that lest a fundamental reordering of society occurs this illusion will remain. 
In this regard, political secularisation is a restraint over religion rather than liberation 
from it, indicating that individuals remain captive to a certain way of knowing, because 
83 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Available at, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm, (accessed:20/07/2012).
84 Marx, On the Jewish Question. Available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/  ,  (accessed: 20/07/2012).
85 Toscano, Beyond Abstraction, p11
86 Karl Marx quoted in Toscano, Beyond Abstraction, p24
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material reality requires it. However, by invoking the potential for change through a 
stratified class system and indicating that there is a 'true' secularisation, Marx's 
argument again centres on the claim of ideology and thus requires the same 
epistemological critique as that applied to commodity fetishism in the previous chapter. 
To recall, Foucauldian thought is sceptical of the teleology that Marx inscribes, the 
assumption of a class strata that this teleology demands and the invocation of 'truth' that 
this holds.  The cogency of a Foucauldian epistemological assessment of Marx's critique 
of religion is best understood through a basic historical analysis of the radicalism of the 
1960s. If we follow Marx's outline, radicalism leads to 'true secularisation', however, the 
history of the 1960s indicates that rather than seeking to throw off the last shackles of 
tradition and religion, and lead towards a new radical imaginary, individuals sought to 
express themselves beyond any religious or political authority, through consumption 
and enjoyment.87 This individualism was understood to be political insofar as it rejected 
the old, the staid and the religious. However the radical individualist movement did not 
develop a narrative for the future, it was enough to just be.88 A classical Marxist 
response to this would recognise that these movements were not driven by the working 
class, and were largely led by students and those disaffected with the system. But even 
in this rebuttal we see the determinism and teleology of Marxist thought, as it locates 
the potential for revolutionary change solely in the working class. The response to this 
can be summed up with – where were they? Or perhaps with a Foucauldian accent, who 
are the 'working class'? Can we point to them? And if so, do people identify with this 
label? Furthermore, why is it this label in particular which unites? What of gender, race, 
age, sexuality? From such questions, the 1960s can be understood as the expression of 
human creativity, shattering the master narrative of Marx. But negating the Marxist 
explanation of 'true secularisation' and questioning the label of 'working class' should 
not lead to the conclusion that the expression of individualism was the product of 
individuals, independent of some higher authority. Holding a Foucauldian perspective 
leads to the conclusion that a more subtle process of power was taking place. 
To explore this power, it is interesting to consider the analysis of the 1960s offered by 
87 Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, p xviii.
88 Gitlin, The Sixties: years of hope, days of rage, p427.
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philosopher Charles Taylor who explained the expressive individualism of the period, 
through the understanding that 'many people feel called to do this... feel their lives 
would be wasted, or unfulfilled if they didn't.'89 This is an important point for two 
reasons. First, Taylor indicates that this deeply individualised process is bound within a 
common sense which encases individual thought and action, and is encouraged and 
further legitimated through instrumental reason as the right and meaningful way to live. 
In this way, he recognises that powerful societal and moral understandings were guiding 
this individualism, not the negation of them.90 Second, Taylor identifies that this societal 
understanding of individualism produces a psychological effect if it is not reached, 
when he says 'feel their lives would be wasted or unfilled.' Thus Taylor indicates an 
anxiety associated with individualism: the anxiety of not 'being' an individual spurs an 
individual to 'become' an individual. This would appear tautological-- that an individual 
can become an individual-- however it is made functional through the psychological 
effect of anxiety because it is a type of individualism which is demanded. This makes 
sense if we consider the individual as individual and the anxious individual as the 
subject of capitalism. When considering these points together, it becomes evident that 
modernity is powerful, rather than powerless. Individuals intuitively understand what is 
right and wrong, despite no higher authority determining this. Anxiety is the modern 
expression of the guilt that Weber identified. Thus the importance of Taylor's point is 
that it serves to challenge the teleology of Bell and Marx whilst recalling the Weberian 
notion of 'the calling'. For this reason the analysis offered by Taylor can be taken as a 
reminder of the relationship between religion and the economy and thus encourages a 
thorough investigation of modern power.
To be clear, Taylor does not make these acknowledgements, and suggests that this 
individualist belief is occasioned by a certain kind of political liberalism which has 
spawned a culture.91 But if we recall the connection between belief, limits and meaning 
that Bell set up, we can see that what Taylor has identified in the expressivism and 
consequent anxiety of the 1960s is not-not a religion: it is a sense, a belief, a morality, 
which guides individuals to realise, actualise and be themselves in this world, and thus 
89  Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1991), p15.
90 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, pp15-17.
91 Ibid, p18.
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gives them meaning. This recognises that individuals who are perceived to be 
hedonistic, narcissistic non-believers are actually encapsulating the secular capitalist 
belief system. And thus the criticism of individualism offered by Bell misses the moral, 
religious basis of these attitudes and further misses the induced trauma of not 
'becoming'. Individualism is the moral base of secular-capitalism. Individual anxiety can 
be understood  as an effect of modern power. This schema sounds absurd, and perhaps is 
absurdist. But if we maintain that theology is not external from the economy and that in 
this way capitalism requires a morality for justification, it follows that the secular 
individualism of modern capitalism must be this justification. The implication of this is 
that the dialectic of release and restraint proposed by Bell about the dualism of 
religion/secular dissipates. What we arrive at instead is an understanding of the restraint 
of the secular (religion). The importance of identifying this secular (religion) is that 
power pervades society and it is this power which determines the limits of 
individualism; anxiety is the evidence of power. This fundamentally challenges the way 
we understand the history of the twentieth century. It further suggests that there is an 
ethos to secular capitalism, but this ethos is determined by something higher than 
individuals. In this regard the individual that Bell recognised as definitive of the modern 
period becomes a (anxious) subject of capitalism. This understanding questions the 
suggestion of freedom altogether. 
The charge of the modernist scholar would be to ask how this individualism is religious, 
because, simply, we are individuals. To which it must be thrown back how can it not be? 
We adorn ourselves with clothes and trinkets, colour our hair and collect collectables to 
become who we want to be. This indicates, that to realise individualism requires money. 
With this we return to money and the belief in it. Individuals believe in money and do 
not question its veracity, because they use it in their everyday lives to realise themselves 
as well as to simply exist within the limits of society. There is an affective relationship 
between money and the individuals who use it. More than a functional object devoid of 
meaning, money is invested with associations of power and emotional attachments of 
self-realisation as identified in chapter one. This is not to suggest that money is God, as 
cultural theologian David Chidester has recognised this suggestion simply 'mystifies the 
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workings of money'.92 What is more insightful about the complexity of power in 
contemporary capitalism is that we believe we do not believe. We denounce the 
religious beliefs of others because we cannot prove its existence- where is the 
evidence?- and in so doing invest our own beliefs with a neutrality that removes the 
historicity of it, and thus removes the process whereby such an epistemology was 
determined. In this regard it is a process of double worship: we believe we do not 
believe, and through this belief we believe in ourselves, in money, in the system of 
capitalism because we can see and thus know these things to be real. Modern power is 
more pervasive and subtle because it is seemingly undetectable. There is no explicit 
source of power to which we can point, because power exists in the beliefs held by 
individuals. For this reason it is more totalising. 
Italian Philosopher Giorgio Agamben offers an explanation of power in his work The 
Kingdom and the Glory. Agamben indicates that his concern in identifying the 
religiosity of the secular is to articulate the genealogy of power and government within 
the modern-secular world. Agamben suggests that power emanates from the economy. 
To delineate this, Agamben traces the meaning of the word oikonomia from Aristotle 
into the Christian age and stresses that its base meaning is administrative, concerned 
primarily with the 'ordered arrangement' of objects.93 Accordingly, he connects the 
ordering of the economy with a religious modality, something he suggests has not been 
analysed in modern thought. This lack of analysis is of concern to Agamben because it 
has resulted in locating the source of power in the polis, a contention which becomes 
increasingly ridiculous once you try to discover the ‘sovereign’ in international financial 
markets, or to discover the sovereignty of money. The implication of the argument that 
the polis holds power, is that individuals hold complete agency. But perhaps more 
importantly, it suggests that individuals hold effective power through their agency. 
Agamben indicates that this understanding removes any recognition that agency is 
conditioned in relation to the structures within which it exists, and thus fails to consider 
the constraint of everyday life. 
92 David Chidester, Authentic Fakes: Religion and American Popular Culture, (Berkley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), p119.
93  Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government (Homo Sacer, 2), (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp17-18.
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Agamben asserts that the world belongs to a 'divine oikonomia'.94 This indicates the 
inability to dissect and extricate the religious from the economic or political sphere. He 
identifies that the religious is bound within the economic and thus recalls Weber's 
conceptual relationship between capitalism and religion. Rather than seeing religious 
man endowing the political with his beliefs (though this of course occurs because 
religions continue to exist), Agamben suggests that the way society is ordered is the 
most significant means of power, as the ordering infects individuals with a belief in this 
ordering and thus holds a performative character. Through this suggestion, Agamben 
elucidates that the modern economy is both a discourse and a reality:95 it is not just as it 
is, but must also be legitimated through the way in which we speak and think, and the 
things we use to exist within it. It is this discourse and existent reality which is the 
constraint on agency. Put in another way, the ontology of the economy--  what we know 
to exist-- births an epistemology –  the  way we know – which supports itself. A similar 
point was expressed in chapter one in regards to the ideological separation of economics 
from political economy. The discourse that neoclassical economics enabled, removed 
the possibility of examining inequality and poverty because the explicit focus was on 
the moment of exchange. Because people experienced the reality of exchange, they 
'forgot' about the process which preceded this moment. If this line of reasoning holds – 
that ontology births an epistemology – then the secular individualism is the means to 
which individuals are bound within the system of capitalism, because it structures their 
lives to 'forget' that this way of living and being is a construct as well. It is this ordering 
which produces individuals as subjects, and the epistemology of individual rationality 
which produces them as governable.
To appreciate the full importance of the claim that individuals are produced by the 
ordering of secular capitalism, it is useful to recall Taylor again. With Taylor's 
understanding, there is potential for change in the trajectory of society because he sees 
the current beliefs to be a consequence of politics. In contrast, Agamben argues that 
these beliefs are generated through the ordering of the economy. Agamben's thesis 
closes the possibility of Taylor's argument because Agamben understands power to 
emanate from the oikonomia, not the polis. Because the oikonomia is a structured 
94 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p4.
95  Ibid, p66.
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ordering of objects which is infinitely more complex and layered, extending over vast 
geographies and space and time, compared with the polis where there is a particular 
hierarchical arrangement of political actors within a particular geography. Agamben 
recognises that the political is the process by which ordering is legitimated, and thus 
plays a crucial role in cohering belief, but is not of the most importance.96 In this regard 
there must be an analysis of both the economic structures and the political discourses by 
which this ordering is legitimated. But, importantly, Agamben makes no mention of the 
anxiety associated with the individualism that Bell and Taylor indicated. This is not a 
deficiency in his work, but rather a consequence of his focus on understanding modern 
power. By joining the insights that Agamben offers about power, with the understanding 
of anxiety from Bell and Taylor, the innovation that this chapter makes, is that anxiety is 
the residue of individualism, and the belief in individualism is a product of the ordering 
of the economy. Thus, capitalism produces anxiety through the ordered isolation of 
individuals in society. The conclusion of this understanding is that we are beings of our 
time. We cannot escape the way we think and feel, or rather there are limits to what this 
thinking and feeling and further acting can be, even within our material reality. Anxiety 
is productive because, just as the guilt identified by Weber, it encourages self-
governance by the subject which in turn legitimates the ordering of the economy. 
♦
This chapter has explored the secular belief associated with modern capitalism through 
a critical reading of the argument made by modernist scholar Daniel Bell. An historical 
materialist analysis was queried as a means through which to challenge Bell. However, 
evidence of the expressivism of the 1960s, coupled with the epistemological critique 
carried over from chapter one indicates that the teleology of Marx suppresses any 
understanding of human possibility and thus limits the understanding of agency and 
reduces the complexity of power. In contrast to this, the line of reasoning outlined 
suggests that agency is possible, though this is manipulated through the epistemology of 
capitalist society and thus is limited in effective power. The argument that has been built 
here is that the subjectivity of individuals is produced through the ordering of the 
96 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p66
34
economy. The following chapter will apply this conceptual argument in relation to a 
historical analysis of the neoliberal period, the hyperbolic period of the American 
Dream. The story of neoliberalism and how it occurred is widely known, however the 
story which will be told exposes a different development and realisation of it. It is a 
story in which agency, ideas and structure intersect in such a way that freedom became 
the clarion call of all. The point that must be carried from this chapter to the next is that 
the ontological limits of our society are defined by the ordering of liberal secularism. It 
is this ontology which creates an epistemology that produces individuals as subjects and 
thus makes them governable
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Chapter 3
The Other Story of Neoliberalism
The rise of neoliberalism is generally associated with the failure of Keynesian economic 
theory. After decades of stability and prosperity generated by Keynesian economic 
policy the 1970s were marked by the economically debilitating experience of 
stagflation. This anomalous condition can be understood simply as the simultaneous 
occurrence of high levels of unemployment and inflation. This meant that while a larger 
proportion of Americans were out of work, the price of money was increasing which 
created economic and social costs to society at large. This condition was anomalous 
because mainstream Keynesian theory, the basis of American government policy since 
the 1930s, could not explain it, nor produce a solution to it. This chapter is not 
concerned with explaining how stagflation occurred; it is interested in delineating how 
the anomaly of stagflation served as the final justification for the re-direction of the 
American nation away from New Deal politics to the pursuit of freedom. Thus to 
understand how this change occurred, it is necessary to look beyond the theoretical 
debate between Keynesian and neo-classical economists to the demographic and 
institutional changes which took place from the 1930s onwards. This chapter considers 
the spectre of communism, the decline in union power, the emergence of a rising middle 
class and the eruption of divergent political movements. The point to stress is that the 
turn to freedom was the rational expression of individuals reacting to changes in their 
social and economic milieu. The chapter indicates that presidential candidate Ronald 
Reagan capitalised on this anti-government mood and the debilitating condition of 
stagflation to present his path of Freedom as the only alternative for America. Thus, 
freedom became the apparent panacea to America's political and economic woes. This 
chapter therefore offers an outline of the historical development of the neoliberal period.
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3.1The inextricable bond: economics and politics
The stability and prosperity of the post-war period is largely attributed to the success of 
Keynesian economic theory.97 However, the experience of stagflation left the certainty 
of Keynesian theory in question as stagflation was a theoretical impossibility in 
Keynesianism, a fact which rendered the theory useless in creating a solution. The 
policy options of Keynesianism rested on the theoretical assumption, derived through 
the Phillips curve, that unemployment and inflation are negatively related.98 Thus, as 
one rises the other will fall. Stagflation is the experience of both economic maladies at 
once, and thus left Keynesian scholars silent. It was because of the theoretical silence of 
Keynesianism that the voices of the Chicago school of economics, led by Milton 
Friedman, became more pronounced, and persuasive. The argument they made was not 
new; it extended back to the neoclassical quantity theory of money of the late nineteenth 
century. Indeed it was this very theory against which Keynes had developed his theory, 
and which the experience of the Great Depression had made void. The theory on which 
Friedman based this attack is the neoclassical theory of money which was 
problematised in chapter one. It is useful to recall its associated methodological 
problems as these remain in the macroeconomic expression of the theory propounded 
by Friedman.
The quantity theory of money revived by Friedman stressed that monetary changes are 
the causes not the consequences of recessions. Thus government injections into the 
economy are understood to spur inflationary pressures, as they produce a situation of 
'too much money chasing too little goods'.99 With Keynesianism held in check by the 
experience of stagflation, Friedman's theoretical revival appeared vindicated. He argued 
that the Phillips curve was vertical in the long run, which indicated no discernible trade-
off between unemployment and inflation and effectively delegitimised government 
involvement in the economy.100 The political consequences of this theory were clear: 
97 My use of the term Keynesian should be understood as the neoclassical synthesis, unless specified 
otherwise.
98 Brian Snowdon and Howard R Vane, Modern Macroeconomics: Its origins, development and current  
state, (Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2005), p142.
99 Snowdon and Vane, Modern Macroeconomics, p170.
100  Ibid, p174-175
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leave the market alone. 
The resuscitation of falsified theory provoked an initial flurry of controversy within the 
economic academy.101 The falsified quantity theory of money, the perspective that 
Friedman held, was a minority, if maligned perspective, 'regarded as eccentric(s) by the 
great majority of ... intellectuals'.102  However the implications of this theory were 
significant and thus required a considered response. Accordingly, a great debate ensued. 
But in this context, Keynesian theory appeared more retrograde and unrealistic as the 
situation of stagflation intensified. How could the Keynesian position hold when 
inflation and unemployment continued to rise? There could be no response in the face of 
such facts, as something was evidently wrong. This was the charge made by 
conservative economists, and by 1972, even amongst avowed Keynesians, the 'vertical 
in the long run view of the Phillips curve had won the day.'103 Friedman's theory seemed 
to explain the reality of stagflation through the commitment to the non-neutrality of 
money and adaptive expectations of individuals. This exposes the fact that 
understanding money requires more than an understanding of its function. Friedman's 
theory depends on the rationality of individuals and the seamless functioning of the 
market system. Through his theory, Friedman indicated that if governments did attempt 
to rectify the situation, firstly, there would be a lag in government policy 
implementation and secondly it would cause more harm as individuals would change 
their expectations according to the information that they held.104 Thus any attempt by 
government to appease the situation of stagflation was expressed as futile and further 
detrimental. 
This change in theoretical agreement did not translate immediately into changes in 
government policy. But by 1977 Democratic president Jimmy Carter introduced anti-
Keynesian policy in a bid to get tough on stagflation. This was significant because the 
Democrats had long been the advocates of Keynesian theory against the fiscal 
conservatism of the Republican Party. In response to Carter's policy, liberal Democrats 
101 Ibid, p169.
102 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1982). (lecture 
series actually given in 1956, pvi.
103 A.S Blinder quoted in Snowdon and Vane, Modern Macroeconomics, p179.
104 Ibid,  p175.
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still faithful to Keynesian theory argued that Carter's policy was inattentive to the 
situation of unemployment.105 But such criticisms held little theoretical or political 
traction and Carter persevered, to push through an austerity package which held the 
essence of Friedman's economics.106 Carter suggested that he could achieve the liberal 
policies of the Democratic Party with the conservative constraints dictated by 
neoclassical theory. He ultimately failed to fulfil this pledge because it was an attempt 
to bind two contradictory political ontologies together: Keynesian and conservative.107 
Each theoretical understanding starts from theoretically diverse points which contain 
divergent political impetus'. For this reason, it is important to consider that economics is 
not devoid of politics. Economics posits a political ontology, and thus must be critically 
analysed as such. This indicates that the experience of stagflation eroded traditional 
politics, principles, values, and ideas because the focus of politicians was on 
ameliorating the inflationary pressures of the economy, because inflation 'robs all of 
us.'108, 109 
The criticisms brought against neoclassical theory in chapter one identified that the 
removal of social considerations from its mandate was driven by the pursuit of 
objectivity. The removal of the social was a product of the Enlightenment epistemology, 
rather than a conspiratorial means through which to quell concerns with distributional 
questions. If we recall, neoclassical economics sterilised the laboratory of economic 
science. However, above this epistemological base of scientism, and more consciously 
because of this, a change in economic theory is the product and expression of a political 
worldview.110 This suggests that economic theory does not just emerge from nowhere; it 
is reflective of the social and economic milieu in which it is written, and it further 
105 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A history, 1974-2008, (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2008), 
p79.
106 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, pp78-79.
107  Anthony S Campagna, The Economy in the Reagan Years: The economic consequences of the Reagan 
Administration, (Westport: Greenwood press, 1994), p24.
108 Campagna, The Economy in the Reagan Years, (Westport: Greenwood press, 1994), p25.
109 In the introduction of this legislation into the House of Representatives Carter made no mention of the 
supply side shocks as a consequence of the increases in the price of OPEC oil. Focus was specifically 
on the domestic economy and the possibility to open it to entrepreneurship. He was invoking language 
more commonly associated with Reagan, even before Reagan came to office. Carter's full speech is 
available at, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7344, (accessed: 12/10/2012).
110 Gilles Dostaler, Keynes and Friedman on Money, in Money, Financial Institutions and 
Macroeconomics, eds. Avi J Cohan, Harald Hegemann, John Smithin, (Dordrecht: Klummer 
Academic Publishers group, 1997), p85.
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expresses the political perspective of the person by whom it is written. This 
substantiates the basic claim that economics is political. The theory proposed by 
Friedman is no different. Friedman's theory is intimately bound with a conservative 
vision of individualism and freedom, expressed no better than in his popular text 
Capitalism and Freedom. Friedman claimed that '(h)istorical evidence speaks with a 
single voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market.111 Here he 
suggests that the freedom of individuals can only be ensured through an economic 
system that is organised by the free movement of individuals and capital through 
exchange. Thus, he condemns any system in which government removes this freedom 
through involvement in the economy. With this understanding, the jousting match 
between Keynesian economists and the Chicago school is exposed as more than a battle 
about competing theoretical abstractions, but rather a battle of conflicting views of what 
an economy is, how to understand individuals within this economy, and ultimately what 
the role of government should be. Views which are irreducibly political. 
For this reason, the change in policy measures during Carter's presidency cannot be 
accepted as a simple tale of  improvements made in economic knowledge and policy. 
The power and narrative of ideas were at play. Friedman's was a narrative of success 
born of freedom, a narrative which came to be most emphatically expressed by 
president Ronald Reagan. In recognising the relationship between Reagan and 
neoclassical economics it is important to note the significant difference between 
Reagan's public statements to reduce government and the fact that the size of the 
American state actually expanded during his presidency. The tension that existed was 
that, despite the expansion of the state, the march of the ideology of individualism was 
taking place simultaneously. The question asked by chapter four is how this paradox has 
been functional. However, before this question can be considered, it is important to 
recognise the demographic and institutional changes that America underwent following 
the passing of the New Deal legislation in 1933, the beginning of the Keynesian period. 
By considering the changes that American society underwent through the period which 
preceded neoliberalism it is possible to understand the turn to neoliberalism. 
111  Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p9.
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3.2  Demographic and institutional change
This section considers the decline of union power from the 1930s, the growth of the 
middle class through the 1950s, and the radicalism of the new Right and Left in the 
1960s. In this way the revival of neoclassical theory will be understood within a 
historical context, rather than within the confines of theoretical debate. This historical 
moment of stagflation, which preceded and endured in Reagan's era, must be 
understood through the prism of the Cold war and Keynesian prosperity. 
The New Deal was introduced in 1932 as a measure to quell the devastation of the Great 
Depression.  It was the earliest example of Keynesian theory in the American economy 
which held the specific intention of relief, recovery and reform.112 Labour historian, 
Robert Zieger notes that as the state expanded in support of those in need, union 
membership also increased, from three to nine million during 1932-1939.113 He indicates 
that the economic hardship of the period propelled workers to join unions despite the 
founding American narrative of individualism. Certainly, the 1930s were a radicalising 
period because of the material hardship people had to endure. The evidence of 
radicalism follows the Marxian schema, that the hardship of the material conditions of 
life will shatter the capitalist illusion and thus bring into focus true consciousness 
defined by class-based politics. However, Zieger identifies that as workers rights and 
wages increased through the reforms of the state, the power of unions receded and thus 
the radicalism of the period was suppressed.114 This point serves to indicate that the 
Keynesian state quelled the radicalism of the period. 
Political scientist Michael Goldfield identifies the passing of the Taft Hartley Act as 
being especially devastating for the union movement, as it curtailed union rights while 
increasing those of the employer. This Act was argued by conservative politicians as the 
'right to work', which was an explicit attack on union organising.115 The effect of the Act 
112 The New Deal: Measure for Relief, Recovery and Reform, available at 
http://www.mrfarshtey.net/notes/relief-recovery-reform.pdf, (accessed: 30/09/2012).
113 Robert H. Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, 1920-1985, (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
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and other anti-union offensives was to turn the focus of union delegates away from 
radical demands towards fighting off the anti-union offensive, to maintain the 
institutional existence of the union.116 But in maintaining this defensive position and 
suppressing any radicalism in the rank and file it has been argued that there was a loss 
of class-based politics, as labour/capital relations were about appeasement not 
agitation.117 The point that must be stressed is that the decline of unions was not only a 
consequence of the explicit anti-union movement pushed by conservative politicians. 
Rather the very institutional existence of the Keynesian state served to limit the 
potential of unions. In this regard there was explicit and implicit suppression of union 
power: through the state and through conservative politicians. The historical evidence 
of this attests the Marxian schema of class relations and further indicates the prohibitive 
basis of the capitalist state. 
However, as the power of unions receded, the Keynesian welfare state created a rising 
and expanding middle class. By the 1960s real weekly earnings of production workers 
had increased by 70% and 60% of all American families were classified by economists 
as middle class.118 The fact that material life was more secure than before the war 
enabled increasing levels of consumption. By the end of the 1960s 75% of Americans 
owned their own car, 87% had a TV, and 75% had a washing machine in their home.119 
Perhaps most significantly home ownership increased from 44% in 1930 to 64% in 
1965.120, 121 This material abundance can be seen in other ways by noting the change in 
the types of jobs people were undertaking. By 1956 the number of white collar jobs 
outnumbered those of blue collar, and thus America came to be officially classified as a 
post industrial society.122 The idea of  'working class' seemed to no longer apply. There 
116 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, p108.
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was a diminishing industrial base made up on a diminishing unionised workforce, 
uninterested in the radical demands of collective struggle.123 Even though the majority 
of working society were workers in a technical sense, whereby they had a boss or 
manager who dictated how and what would be produced or serviced, increasingly 
American's were not associated with the union movement because the types of work 
available were individualist.124 It is interesting to consider this turn against union 
politics in relation to what it indicates about the American Dream. Through the statistics 
outlined above, it would appear that the American Dream was largely achieved during 
the Keynesian period. As Keynesianism created the prosperity and stability under which 
the middle class grew. However, it can be contended that this prosperity was the 
realisation of the anti-American Dream precisely because the state played a significant 
role in its creation, rather than the entrepreneurship of the individual. 
Despite this contradiction in the individualism of the middle class, what became evident 
in the early 1960s, and most pronounced in the Barry Goldwater presidential campaign 
of 1964, was the very real emergence of a rising, grassroots Right. This grassroots Right 
was largely made up of the statistically new middle class.125 Lisa McGirr rubs against 
the grain of progressive historians when she suggests that this rising Right 'was not an 
irrational, momentary outburst of psychologically maladjusted men and women ... they 
felt compelled to enlist in battle ... because of their sense of a widening chasm between 
the world of the New Deal liberal state and the values they found meaningful.'126 As 
immediate economic pressures faded to memory, political concerns came to centre on 
the erosion of the fundamental values of America under the Great Society. However 
McGirr expresses that these concerns were largely overshadowed by the spectre of 
communism, which McCarthyism had entrenched in the American psyche in the 
1950s.127 To be sure, these were distinct fears of the middle class which became meshed 
together; fears that were stoked by conservative politicians and public intellectuals, who 
made connections between the welfare state and socialism, socialism with communism, 
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and communism with fascism.128 
Through this schema, the appeased class relations of the welfare state, which suppressed 
rather than agitated class interests, was an attack on the fundamental rights of freedom 
and liberty, and tradition. With this reasoning, it was understood that the state, and its 
expansion, should be fought at all costs. In this regard it is possible to infer that the 
grassroots Right excised their economic development from the state and instead inferred 
their rise as a consequence of individual pursuit. Philosopher Wendy Brown offers an 
explanation of this by indicating that the middle class depends on the naturalisation of 
capitalism to legitimate their position,129 which consequently legitimates the position of 
lower socio-economic groupings. Individualism was expressed by the rising Right as 
the only legitimate means by which people could advance, despite the fact that the 
prosperity and stability they experienced was a consequence of Keynesian policies. The 
individualism of the Right consequently served to de-legitimise the structural and 
discursive limits which prohibited the advancement of all.
The identification of the rise of the Right gains significance when understood in 
reference to the secular belief explained in chapter two. If we recall, belief is not an 
individual mental thing, but is fostered and developed through the structuration of 
everyday life. The overt religious beliefs of the Right are justified through secular 
individualism because the very premise of the secular belief is that people can choose to 
be, do and act as they want and thus they are able to hold religious beliefs despite the 
secularity of society. Through this it is possible to recognise that the conservatism of 
these individuals was a rational expression of their discontent of the erosion of values. 
However if we carry over the argument developed in chapter two, this indicates that the 
ideas held by the Right are products of the system of capitalism. The point to recall is 
that power exists in these beliefs, not because they are religious beliefs but because they 
are expressed against other beliefs. This indicates that the middle class has a particular 
consciousness. Which would suggest that as people move from one class strata to the 
next their concerns change. This again would follow a Marxian schema, lest for the 
128 Ibid, p69.
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recognition that the secular belief of individualism –  the basic belief of subjects – is a 
product of the system of capitalism. Thus the individualism of the Right is morally 
justified. 
 The prosperity of Keynesianism also bore developments in radical Left politics. What 
came to be known as the New Left was the expression of discontent with the 
determinism of the (old)Left and the reactionary base of the Right. Undoubtedly, the 
echoes of Stalin and the 'horrors' of collectivism played into this positioning. As Todd 
Gitlin suggests, the New Left was resolutely anti-communist, interested in the 'small 
task of changing the world.'130 He also identifies that the New Left opposed the 
liberalism of the welfare state that the unions supported. For these reasons, the New 
Left mirrored the Right, despite their existent diametric opposition. In contrast to the 
Right, the New Left criticised organised labour for support of the Vietnam War and the 
racist tendency within unions which discriminated against African Americans.131 The 
radical politics of the New Left were unlike anything the country had ever seen. The 
New Left was a fight for individual freedoms and the traditional Left's demand for 
social equality; demands that were continually stitched together through the ferment of 
the period.132 Gitlin identifies that 'as the war movement subsided, many students found 
it an opportune moment to trade in their activism for a ticket to the less risky, more 
pleasurable counterculture.'133 He explains it as if a link between the past and present 
'snapped', and with this any pretence of political orientation of the movement 
disappeared.134 The individual was pursued, just as the Right had demanded, but through 
an expression that was anathema to their values. It was another expression of the anti- 
American Dream.
As Wendy Brown suggests, the focus of the Left shifted away from the system of 
capitalism to the 'wounded attachments' of identity, and in this regard change was 
understood to arrive only through introspection.135 Historical analysis of this period 
indicates the difficulty the Left found in articulating an alternative mass politics in light 
130 Gitlin, The Sixties, p174.
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of the broad Keynesian consensus, and the commitment to individualism developed 
through opposition to the Soviet Union. Thus just as the rational basis of the revival of 
the Right, this turn must be understood as rationally determined: there was no other 
political option but to turn in on the self and demand freedom from the political. This is 
an important point because it recalls the argument made by Bell which suggested that 
individuals are hedonistic. Brown's point indicates the superficiality of  the charge of 
hedonism because she recognises the historical period, and the contest of politics 
through history. Thus the importance of Brown's understanding of the 'wounded 
attachments' of individualism is that she identifies the turn as a product of historical 
circumstance. Her argument is not teleological like Marx's, but remains to hold an 
analysis of power. The power she identifies will be a point of discussion in the 
following chapter. What is important to stress now is that with this individualist turn, 
freedom was the drive of both the political Left and Right, and thus the political debate 
between them appeared to close. To be sure, the experience of stagflation was further 
evidence for the need for change, as the continual devastation which it imposed on 
ordinary people sounded the death knell of the New Deal era.136 It is with this historical 
understanding that we can comprehend the success of the march for freedom that 
Reagan laid out.
3.3  The march to Freedom
This section will consider Reagan's pre-election mandate for freedom made in 
opposition to the un-freedom of the Soviet Union and the founding narrative of the 
nation.
By the presidential election of 1981, the inflation level was a staggering 12.5%137 
coupled with an unemployment rate of 7.5%.138 The human costs of this were expressed 
virulently by Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. His experience as a boy 
136 William G Mayer, The Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed 
between 1960 and 1988, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992), p93.
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during the Great Depression gave gravitas to his anti-New Deal tale about the absolute 
need for entrepreneurship, human advancement, and independence. Ultimately he 
espoused independence from the state. He would say emphatically 'we don't need 
government to fix our problems, government is the problem.'139 But in saying this he 
continuously invoked the words 'we', 'us', 'our', in an effort to coalesce and differentiate 
those who struggle under stagflation and those who do not-  pointing the finger directly 
at the Carter administration and the federal government as a whole.140  As John Patrick 
Diggens indicates, by invoking these terms of inclusion, Reagan glossed over 
recognition of substantive difference. Reagan saw no variation between 'capital and 
labor, virtue and interest, or a market economy and popular democracy.'141 Which 
further inferred the national character as being defined by independence from the state. 
Reagan revived a national identity around the recognition of individuality, which 
paradoxically inferred that 'we' are all the same in 'our' individuality. There is a 
productive contradiction at play in this, as the celebration of the nation was expressed as 
the refutation of the existence of a society. He spoke for individuals united in liberty, 
and thus revived the founding myth of the nation.  'America' he once said has a 
'rendezvous with destiny'.142 But he was clear to advise that this can only be achieved 
through the pursuit and defence of freedom. Nationalism thus made Reagan's 
conservative policies functional.
 Freedom was an important rallying cry for Reagan because it held the dual function of 
recalling the glorious past and intoning the possible future of un-freedom. This is 
captured most clearly in a speech given on the presidential campaign trail for Senator 
Barry Goldwater, when he said 'there is no such thing as a left or right. There's only an 
up or down- man's old -old aged dream, the ultimate in individual freedom... or down to 
the ant heap of totalitarianism.'143 With such lines, Reagan was able to sweep over 
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political divides and ensure the nation was unified against the common enemy of 
communism, lest they be chagrined as un-American. In this regard, the spectre of 
communism was ever present and drawn upon by Reagan. He attempted to coalesce 
support in unions through this anti-communism and by expressing that he was not 
antagonistic with the unions. To be sure, Reagan was the first ex-union leader to reach 
the presidency, and said that under his presidency, 'American workers will once again be 
heeded. Their needs and values will be acted upon.'144 By framing his argument in this 
way, Reagan was able to gain support from those Democratic voters who were 
dissatisfied with the liberalism of the Great Society. He argued that such programs were 
undue privileges to 'special interests', which was anathema in a meritocracy such as 
America and further constituted an abuse of the individual's freedom to choose.145 Thus, 
Reagan developed a clear narrative about freedom, the possibility of losing freedom and 
the need for the absolute defence of freedom. This narrative highlighted the market as 
the only alternative, and the only means of salvation for the nation.
Reagan's policy platform, and in particular the proposal of across-the-board tax cuts, 
was expressed as the panacea to the economic and political woes of hard working 
Americans who held aspirations above their material reality. Broadly, he stuck to a 
typical conservative agenda of small government, however it was the tax cuts which 
became a galvanising force in his campaign. The economic rationale behind this policy 
was based on the Laffer curve which indicated that tax cuts would encourage economic 
growth, and in so doing, increase tax revenues. By reducing the overall tax rates 
investment would be induced and thus create new production.146 Interestingly, such 
policy is contrary to the economic orthodoxy that was revived by the Chicago school. In 
fact, Reagan's policy was understood as inflationary by the orthodoxy, as increases in 
the flow of money during inflationary periods, no matter where it comes from, was 
understood to spur inflationary pressures.147 Despite this, Monica Prasad identifies that 
Republicans came to believe that tax cuts were the 'vision of how the Republican party 
could reconcile free-market principles with the need for popular approval'.148 In fact, it 
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appeared of little importance whether the model worked. Laffer himself once said 
'There’s more than a reasonable probability that I’m wrong, but . . . why not try 
something new?'149 This policy constituted a means by which to tap into the very real 
resentment on both the political Left and Right towards the state. Reagan effectively 
drew upon the concerns and struggles of the electorate for his own (conservative) 
political advantage. In this regard, Prasad suggests that the realisation of the market 
should not be understood as a conspiracy theory driven by special interests but rather 
the expression of the voice of the people.150   
In accepting Prasad's assessment of the development of such policy we must take a 
moment of repose to consider that Reagan only won a 51% majority of the electorate. 
Furthermore, there was a significant drop in voter turn out, which suggests a disgruntled 
and unsatisfied electorate. Surely, this would indicate that Reagan failed to convince the 
nation of his ideas and policies, or rather and if we hold Prasad's thesis, the policies and 
ideas that he was presenting weren't what the electorate demanded. As historian Sean 
Wilentz explains, this later fact can be connected to the repudiation of Carter and the 
Democratic Party by traditionally Democratic voters.151 Wilentz suggests that although 
there were many who remained unconvinced and opposed to Reagan's policies, his rise 
was the product of the 'anti-government mood' of the period. Reagan promised  'a 
conservative twist on a radical slogan of the 1960s ... return power to the people.'152 The 
argument that I have been developing here is that there were significant and discernible 
reasons for the turn towards individualism, or at least disengagement: stagflation, failure 
of the welfare state, and the spectre of communism. But we cannot underestimate the 
charismatic and positive nature of Reagan the leader, as this undoubtedly also played a 
role. In this regard, the narrative of neoliberalism must be understood to begin before 
Reagan's rise. Reagan served to legitimate the processes of individualism that were 
already apparent in American society occasioned by changes in domestic and world 
affairs. 
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This chapter has considered some social, political and economic factors which 
contributed to the realisation of the neoliberal narrative of freedom and individual 
liberty. It specifically focused on history as a means to debase the theoretical certainty 
that neoclassical theory was accepted as the only alternative to Keynesianism. This 
identifies that neoliberalism is not merely neoclassical economics transplanted into 
policy. This chapter offers a historical materialist analysis sans the invocation of class 
based revolution. The question which remains to be answered is why people have 
continued to support something which is against their material interests. Framed within 
the language of Marxist theory we are unable to explain this beyond the suggestion of 
false consciousness, which not only fails to afford people the respect of understanding 
their choices, but fails to recognise that there is more to these choices than material 
interest. The more gripping question is to ask how this support was maintained, 
considering the decline in wages, conditions, livelihoods over the last thirty years. In 
this regard, the explanation of the continuation of neoliberalism cannot be reduced to 
some sort of elite conspiracy or an emancipatory tale of people power driving the 
direction of society. An explanation of the continuation of the neoliberal period will be 
formed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4
Deconstructing Freedom 
Freedom is a pain in the ass. And thats 
precisely why it's so imperative that we 
seize the opportunity that's been presented
 to us ... To get a nation of free people to let 
go of their bad logic and sign on with better 
logic, by whatever means are necessary.
Jenna's father in Freedom by Jonathan Franzen
 I was forced to an acknowledgement of the
 stark fact that man is, both physically and 
 morally, a vulnerable being...
 Kingbitter in Liquidation by Imre Kertesz
This chapter brings together the insights generated from the previous chapters to 
indicate how the subjectivity of the neoliberal subject is defined by freedom, 
individualism and anxiety. The first section of the chapter outlines how the 
contradiction of state expansion during the neoliberal period was justified through 
recollection of the 'other'. The second section will indicate what freedom means to the 
individual. Through this schema the chapter will show that the subjectivity of the 
neoliberal individual is not defined by an ideological illusion because individuals are 
involved in the process of producing their own selves. The fact that there are very few 
formal rules which dictate how life should be led elicits an affective power over 
individuals to pursue a life defined by freedom. But rather than the obtainment of 
freedom this requires an engagement with things that cause anxiety: individuals must 
work hard to gain money, to be free. This entrenches the individual in the system and 
thus is a self-reinforcing process of subjectification. In this regard, this last chapter 
comments on the paradoxical predicament of the individual who seeks freedom through 
the limited choices provided by neoliberal capitalism. This thesis contends that 
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recognition of this paradoxical position of subjectification holds the potential for 
transformative change. To whit, this thesis ends as it has begun, suggesting a paradox 
that the absence of agency inscribes itself into a subject for a new world, and in turn the 
subject is inevitably active. In this sense, this thesis offers a philosophical understanding 
of agency.
4.1  The contradiction of (neoliberal) freedom
The ultimate contradiction of freedom under neoliberal capitalism is that the realisation 
of the market was not met with the withering away of the state. Rather the state has 
withered in certain areas and strengthened in others. In recognising this, it is important 
to note that Reagan never said he was against government:
 It's not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work -- 
work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. 
Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster 
productivity, not stifle it.153
This is the expressed essence of an economically conservative government, the ultimate 
role of which is to facilitate the market, not moderate or interfere with it. The 
government ensures the 'rules of the game' are enforced through the creation and 
defence of law which protects individual liberty. To reach this skeletal position, 
economic policies of deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation were legislated to 
remove the state from social provisioning, industry, and wage determination, and thus 
enable the free functioning of individuals within the market. The evidence from 1981-
1988 indicates that this ideal institutional minimum was never reached. In fact, under 
Reagan's government, spending increased, the bureaucracy increased and budget 
deficits rose dramatically.154 For this reason some have labelled Reagan as a 'failed 
revolutionary',155 as he did not implement and thus achieve the sort of economic purity 
that fundamentalists demanded. However, this sort of critique fails to recognise that 
neoliberalism requires this contradictory expansion of the state in order to enable the 
deconstruction of other parts of the state. For example, as Reagan slashed through 
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public provisioning under the mandate of getting government 'off your back', he 
simultaneously increased spending in the department of defence. By 1984 the budget 
expenditure for this department had increased to 32.4% of the total budget of the 
American government.156 In this way the state came to play an increasing role in the 
economy, not a smaller one. And yet the mandate of freedom remained. 
Through an analysis of Reagan's rhetoric it is possible to discern that this was not a 
contradiction to Reagan. In a speech given in 1980 Reagan explained that 'freedom is 
never more than one generation away from extinction. You and I must preserve freedom 
here or it will not be passed on to our children.'157 Thus for Reagan, freedom was the 
justification for non-freedom. It holds that freedom under neoliberal capitalism does not 
mean absolute freedom from the state. Freedom under neoliberalism is negatively 
derived through the positive expression of state power. Freedom functions because of a 
strong, coercive, military state. The military state exists in defence of freedom. In this 
regard, neoliberalism is a functioning contradiction, a push and pull of repression on the 
level of state provisioning and individual expression. It is this contradiction which 
makes the period of neoliberalism so interesting and difficult to discern. Thus 
neoliberalism is not merely the expression of neoclassical economics, there is a belief 
system associated with its acceptance and this stems from the founding narrative of the 
nation: freedom and opportunity.
Wendy Brown suggests that this neoliberal contradiction is made functional through 
what she calls a 'melancholic logic', in which non-freedom becomes a 'threat that works 
as domination in the form of an absorbing ghostly battle with the past.'158 Brown's 
insight is significant because it indicates the power of political ontology to birth a 
societal epistemology – what exists determines how we think and what we know. An 
intellectual example of this was articulated by Friedrich Hayek in The Constitution of  
Liberty when he said ‘(w)e can … not fully appreciate the value of freedom until we 
know how a society of free men as a whole differs from one in which unfreedom 
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prevails.’159 Hayek determined his technical understanding of freedom and liberty 
through a strict distinction from coercion. But Hayek stressed that for these ideals to 
exist in reality, a state must also exist to protect them from individual coercion. Hayek 
identifies that the capacity for coercion (un-freedom) is a legitimate form of power of 
the state if its ambit is to protect individual liberty. However Hayek is clear to express 
that anything beyond this position is an abuse of legitimate power.160 Thus, the 
recollection of un-freedom to understand what it means to be free, even within 
neoclassical philosophy, functions as a justification of the expansion of the state. 
The argument becomes most pronounced when Reagan speaks of freedom in explicit 
reference to un-freedom, as though this is the strict reality of the world. This produces a 
bi-polar understanding that simplifies the contested nature and complexity of domestic 
and world affairs. The contention with this melancholic logic is not that the Soviet union 
did not exist, or that the Soviet Union did not commit un-freedoms. The recollection of 
the Soviet Union by Reagan is always mentioned in reference to freedom and the 
potential of losing this, as though un-freedom is the only other alternative to the 
neoliberal freedom that he champions. This false dichotomy suggests that you are either 
'with us' or 'against us', which is a constructed truth. In this regard, the stressed bi-
polarity of the Cold war served to simplify the neoliberal narrative that Reagan 
legitimated as a defence of freedom, and enabled this story to carry because of the 
knowledge of absolute lack of freedom in the Soviet union. Thus, despite the 
burgeoning reach of the state, the free market gained a sheen of shining actuality, which 
consequently deployed a clear, unapologetic understanding of how to see oneself in the 
world: you are an individual, you are a consumer, you can be an entrepreneur. The 
American Dream is yours for the taking. Take it. Take it. This was and remains the 
captive narrative of the American nation. 
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4.2  Who you are, and who you can become
This section will consider what the free market means for the individual and how this 
affects the individual. This is achieved by exploring the tension between the Marxian 
concept of ideology and the Foucauldian suggestion of governmentality. Recognition of 
this tension serves to indicate the paradox of individual subjectivity in neoliberal 
capitalism. 
 In neoclassical philosophy and neoliberal rhetoric the free market is the ultimate form 
of democracy. If this holds then individuals within society are equal citizens, with equal 
voting power. This foundation of formal equality in the market serves to de-ontologise 
and neutralise the construction of the market sphere as investing individuals with formal 
equality holds the function to undermine an acknowledgment of substantive inequality. 
Hayek defended the fact that inequality exists in societies defined by institutional 
freedom, because he invests individuals with the effective capacity to change their 
situation.161 Thus, any intervention by the state, to appease inequality through the 
provision of services constitutes an attack on democracy. And further, it becomes an 
abuse of individual liberty, as it would be an act of coercion against the collective 
expression of individuals' wants. Under Hayek's methodological framework, critical 
attacks by progressive scholars in regards to inequality could be dismissed because the 
focus on the individual effectively removes analysis of structural or discursive power.162 
Hayek argued strongly that those who suggest circumstance as the determinant of social 
position are fearful of responsibility which 'necessarily also becomes a fear of 
freedom.'163 
Within Reagan's reasoning, opening up the market through policies of deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation, enabled individuals to make decisions that would best 
suit their individual lives. This accords with conservative economic theory as the 
individual is assumed to be rational and utility maximising and thus conscious of the 
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risks associated with choices. To be sure, this understanding serves to structure an 
understanding of individuals as being powerful and effective. It is important to 
recognise also that this power carries responsibility. Reagan's rhetoric indicates that 
anyone is capable of freedom and further, that all Americans should strive towards this. 
This invests people with the understanding that those who succeed are products of their 
own merit and those who do not succeed are failures because of themselves. We must 
recall the argument made by Giorgio Agamben in chapter two which indicated that there 
is a need for political legitimation of the economic ordering of society. This indicates 
that the 'free' individual does not just exist; it must be spoken into existence. This is 
precisely what Reagan's rhetoric serves to do. As Reagan's discourse removes 
recognition of the structural power of the economy, and thereby produces a discursive 
power which is more totalising in its reach because it appears as common sense: you are 
an individual, you can be free because you live in the land of the free. The inscription of 
the individual is always made in reference to the founding narrative of the nation. What 
differs about the neoliberal rhetoric is that the individual is more involved in the process 
of capitalism and thus more dependent, but must maintain the appearance that suggests 
the contrary. Which elicits a process of self enforcement: I am free, because I am an 
individual. I am powerful, because I am an individual. And I must take responsibility 
because there is nothing beyond me. Thus the power of freedom is its capacity to shape 
the norms to which individuals live their lives as individuals. 
The understanding of the effective power of the individual is carried throughout the 
concept of consumer sovereignty which pervades neoliberal capitalism. This concept 
suggests that consumers have effective power through the choices they make in the 
market. Political economist Stefan Schwarzkopf offers a cogent critique of this concept 
through an ontological understanding of consumption. This critique serves to indicate 
the inextricable relationship between production and consumption. Schwarzkopf 
contends that the concept of consumer sovereignty legitimises capitalist market order 
because a focus on consumption removes recognition of production, and thus 
neutralises the process of it.164 This is significant because if there is not analysis of how 
production occurs, then an understanding of the expense of labour power, which is 
164 Stefan Schwarzkopf, The Political Theology of Consumer Sovereignty, in Theory, Culture and 
Society, 2011, v.28, n.3, p122.
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inevitably involved in the process of production, is removed. Schwarzkopf indicates that 
a belief in the sovereignty of the consumer functions as a distraction from the tensions 
which exist between those who have effective power and those who do not. This 
identifies that there must be members of society who hold the capacity to make 
decisions about production. Recognition of this unequal capacity delegitimises the 
suggestion that formal equality explains away substantive inequality. Substantive 
inequality must exist prior to the provision of formal equality. Thus formal equality 
serves to entrench the divide between those who have and those who have not. 
Schwarzkopf's critique of consumer sovereignty indicates the power of discourse to 
present reality in a way that covers structural aspects of the economy. Thus he identifies 
the inherent differences of power in a society organised by freedom. 
Schwarzkopf contends that the concept of consumer sovereignty holds political 
theological baggage, and suggests that it is the expression of a secularised theological 
concept. Recognition of this theological basis of the concept is significant because it 
leads Schwarzkopf to conclude that the freedom acquired through the market is 
premised on constraints over which individuals have no control and which they have no 
capacity to control.165 For this reason Schwarzkopf suggests that consumer sovereignty 
is a fiction, and to think any other way is delusional.166 By invoking the term 'delusion' 
Schwarzkopf necessarily suggests that people are taken in by an ideological illusion 
which  obscures their material reality. This again invokes the determinism of Marx, 
implying that there is some conspiratorial element to consumer sovereignty. The 
argument carried through the thesis thus far suggests that such an understanding misses 
a substantial and perhaps more subtle way in which discourse structures individuals 
lives, and through this, produces subjectivity. The consumer sovereign is not an illusion, 
precisely because of the very real ways in which individuals are involved in the process 
of consumption and the relation that this consumption has to self-realisation. It is 
possible to invoke the Foucauldian concept of governmentality instead, because this 
recognises the common sense and the discourse associated with consumer sovereignty 
and thus the powerful ways in which this serves to structure individuals lives. 
165 Schwarzkopf, The Political Theology of Consumer Sovereignty,  p123.
166 Ibid, p124.
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In his last series of lectures, Foucault noted how the secularism of the market posits its 
own sort of control through the implicit capacity to order, dictate and guide individuals 
into living a particular life and acting in a particular way.167 His interest rested in how 
power becomes a 'body of knowledge that provides the criteria of the ideal subject ... in 
terms of the precise ways in which the actual subject is led to practice itself in satisfying 
these criteria.'168 It is not the laws of enforcement which are of interest but the ways in 
which control is invoked through the capacity to organise and order our understanding 
of ourselves and our actions, paradoxically through the ideal of freedom. Even Hayek 
makes this point when he notes that 'freedom has never worked without deeply 
ingrained moral beliefs ... coercion can be reduced to a minimum only where 
individuals can be expected as a rule to conform voluntarily to certain principles.’169 
It is useful to consider governmentality in regards to the concept of human capital, 
which sits on the understanding of the individual and consumer sovereign and thus 
carries within it the suggestion of responsibility, effective power and choice. Nicholas 
Kiersey identifies that this neoliberal concept is presented as a means by which 
individuals can become entrepreneurs of themselves: they can invest in themselves to 
make their 'capital' more competitive, efficient and productive, and ultimately 
independent of a higher authority.170 We can understand human capital as the active 
decision to consume certain knowledge and skills with the understanding that these 
skills will lead to future realisation of surplus value or wages. Human capital reverses 
the very notion of what employment is for: consumption for employment, rather than 
employment for consumption. And infers that individuals must manufacture themselves 
in a certain way to work within the post-industrial economy. Kiersey identifies that it is 
this process in which individuals consume to work which makes neoliberalism distinct, 
as subjects are not simply produced but are 'in fact productive in a very broad sense.'171 
To understand the nuance of Kiersey's argument it is useful to consider what it means to 
be a worker in neoliberalism, and compare this to fifty years previous. When speaking 
167 Nicholas J Kiersey, Everyday Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Crisis: Post Political Control in an 
Era of Financial Turmoil, in Critical Globalisation Studies, 2011, 4, p31.
168 Kiersey, Everyday Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Crisis, p23.
169  Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p62.
170 Kiersey, Everyday Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Crisis, p34.
171 Ibid, p36.
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about workers of the 1950s we generally reach out to language about the factory, of 
industry; blue collar jobs which sustain the infrastructure and provide the products 
which are used in everyday life and society. It is significant to question whether people 
still consider themselves as workers. Or are subjects of neoliberalism, in this apparently 
post-industrial age, more closely associated with entrepreneurs? If so, labour drops out 
of the everyday lexicon and (worker) entrepreneurs appear to be productive for 
themselves, as though there are no substantive differences between the varying types of 
entrepreneurs. But, and as Kiersey is sure to highlight, (worker) entrepreneurs are in fact 
productive for the sake of capital, because there remains a divide between those who 
have capital and those who only have human capital. Kiersey notes how through 
consumption of human capital 'the worker is fundamentally enjoined with his capacities 
as a kind of assemblage with a dynamic productive potential.'172 This enjoinment 
indicates that the individual is more involved in the process of production than before. 
Individuals produce themselves to produce products/services that are sold through the 
market to create the profits of capital. Thus, in line with the Foucauldian 
governmentality, Kiersey suggests that the apparent choice to produce oneself as the 
basis of society makes individuals 'eminently governable.'173
Kiersey claims, that the production of a governable subject is 'not simply a question of 
the production of subjectivity but, rather, a question of the real and intense ways in 
which the “commanding heights” of the economy have become immanent through the 
hegemony of immaterial labour .... control ... premised upon the production of 
subjectivity by subjectivity.'174 This is significant because if workers are themselves 
entrepreneurs (or understood to be entrepreneurs) then they must bear the full 
responsibility of the risks they 'take', and it is they who must bear the cost of down turns 
in demand. The ultimate paradox of the neoliberal era is that the more 'freedom' 
acquired through the market, the more vulnerable and more governable individuals are. 
Individuals  have no effective capacity, although this is not denied formally. The other 
side of this formality is responsibility, which ensures individuals must discipline 
themselves in line with what the market requires. In this context it is important to 
172 Ibid, p34.
173 Ibid, p35.
174 Ibid, p37.
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reconsider the criticisms of Bell and other neoconservative scholars such as Christopher 
Lasch from chapter two, as Kiersey's argument indicates their superficiality. Bell and 
Lasch suggested that modern society is made up of hedonistic, narcissistic individuals 
who each seek enjoyment through consumption and nothing more. This understanding 
negates the structural and discursive processes whereby the individual is funnelled into 
becoming an individual and must reinforce the subjectivity of themselves. 
What Kiersey has elucidated is that individuals have little substantive control over the 
subject that they wish to become. This subject has already been produced in the market 
and merely requires filling by the subject's self-government. Thus the subjectivity of  
subjectivity arrives through the anxiety induced by the possibility of self-actualisation 
within the constraints of neoliberal capitalism. Individuals must appear free to 
themselves and to capital: have a full life, be in employment that they enjoy and which 
defines 'who they really are'. Certainly individuals have the capacity to choose, but from 
a set of options which has already been produced or is produced through the vicissitudes 
of the market. But with the suggestion of the subjectivity of subjectivity, Kiersey 
effectively denies the capacity of individuals to recognise their subordination and thus 
denies the possibility of agency. He has delineated a thesis more totalising than the 
invocation of ideology through his commitment to Foucauldian thought, and thus infers 
that there is no possibility for change from this subjectification. Despite this denial of 
agency his thesis can be interpreted as an analytical means of understanding how power 
infects the subject. He has identified how subjects are produced in a way that enables 
their continual movement through society but which is deeply traumatising because of 
the market functioning, which enacts self-government. 
4.3  The fantasy meets reality
This section transplants Kiersey's insight into the Zizekian suggestion of fantasy and 
thereby invests individuals with a philosophical agency. Brown's notion of the plastic 
cage is considered as an analogy of the paradoxical position of subjectification that 
neoliberal individuals reside.
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Through a Zizekian frame of analysis it is possible to contend that individuals know of 
their position of un-freedom that Kiersey has indicated. The twist in Zizek's thought is 
that individuals must act in a way which suggests that they are free. Zizek captures this 
peculiarity of neoliberal subjects in his essay Can Lenin Tell us about Freedom today?. 
Zizek's insight goes further than an analysis of human capital, or an ontological reading 
of consumer sovereignty, because he recognises how, as a product of neoliberal 
capitalism, individuals must determine how best to situate themselves within neoliberal 
capitalism, knowing the limitations it sets and the norms it produces. He notes how 
despite formal freedom individuals make decisions which are against their interests 
because of the perceived understanding of what should be chosen.175 We must 
individually develop coping mechanisms to exist, and the only coping mechanism 
which serves this function is to deny the position of un-freedom in which we reside. 
However this mechanism inevitably comes into conflict with the vicissitudes of the 
market because the free market is not stable; the free market means competition, it seeks 
profits and low costs. Thus the reality of the market challenges the very fantasy of 
freedom that we require to live, to cope with the vagaries of market existence. Thus, the 
paradox of life under neoliberal capitalism; not everyone can achieve the heights of 
success, despite the fact that all are encouraged to aspire to this. It is this paradox which 
leads to the devastating question of whether you have failed as an individual, inducing a 
state of anxiety. Individuals cannot argue against wage and job cuts, or the recession. As 
the market is down, and you, you, you, do not fit the bill. Thus making the 
consequences of the market deeply personal. And even though it may be understood that 
the freedom the market affords is definitely contingent on other things, the ideal of 
freedom is continually strived for, because of the total hold it has over the American 
psyche. Because freedom is not a state of being, it is a process and thus hardship and 
struggle is justified, but not appeased. 
 To fully gain the paradoxical nature of the neoliberal subject in American capitalism, it 
is important to finally re-consider money because of the central role that it plays in 
individual's lives and specifically because of its associations. If we recall the argument 
made in chapter one, money is not devoid of meaning and life, as though it were the 
175 Slavoj Zizek, Can Lenin Tell us about Freedom today?. Available at, 
http://www.lacan.com/freedom.htm, (accessed:08/09/2012).
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physical expression of objectively derived value: money is the tool, the symbol, the icon 
which means social power. And the belief that is invested in money is produced through 
the economic-theologic complex that is capitalism. This thesis has led towards the 
conclusion that individuals can not think outside the market, because they require 
money to live, and further, require it to realise themselves. But it is precisely because 
individuals are within the system of capitalism, that they cannot achieve these things. 
Thus, the willingness to believe in money is contingent on the uncertain future, and the 
endless possibility of a better one. This common sense is thus produced in the market 
economy, not outside it. For this reason there is a messy dialectic between the things 
individuals learn to believe through experience and the things they believe implicitly, 
subconsciously, in a way they cannot deny, through imposition and organisation. 
Holding this argumentation leads to the conclusion that American individuals are bound 
in a perpetually traumatising state: freedom loving, liberty seeking and anxiety ridden. 
This indicates the affective power of the American Dream to entrench individuals 
further into a system which cannot appease their wounds. Importantly, this trauma does 
not limit their mobility, it does not paralyse them, but rather enables individual 
continuation. Though it is this mobility which entrenches individuals further and further 
into the system which produces this trauma.176 In this regard, the freedom acquired 
through money is some sort of sadistic joke because this freedom requires a further 
entrenchment in the market for freedom. It is the ultimate paradox of subjectivity under 
neoliberal capitalism: the source of the problem is the perceived solution. 
Brown suggests precisely because power 'irrigates through networks rather than 
consolidating in bosses and kings'177 the modern secular capitalism of neoliberalism is a 
'plastic cage.'178 This suggestion immediately recalls the contested 'iron cage' of Weber 
discussed in chapter two. The walls of this cage are not as solid and distinct as those 
identified by Weber. The walls of this cage are malleable because individuals can move 
around in it and push against it, in an attempt to change themselves in the world. 
However these walls cannot be broken, as there continues to be material and discursive 
176  Konings, Money as Icon, 
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/journals/theory_and_event/v014/14.3.konings.html, 
(accessed: 02/05/2012)..
177 Brown, States of Injury, p34.
178 Ibid, p28
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structures which limit human advancement. This is to go beyond the claim of ideology 
and suggest that in secular-capitalism there is no chance of escape because it structures
what is known and how this known is thought, and through this indicates what exists.
Individualism of contemporary capitalism is shaped by power, not the negation of it. 
This produces a situation -or an experience - more devastating than Weber's iron cage 
because individuals can shape themselves in a way that is of their making but are 
constrained by the prism which capitalism forces them to fit. To be sure, they have the 
power of choice. However they also exist within the vagaries of market existence and 
thus the limited positions of freedom that this affords. Individuals know this, but try 
anyway because they have to try, lest they be chagrined as a dupe, a dropkick, a lay 
about, a nothing. Individuals are nothing without aspirations, and without money they 
are nothing. And so the anxiety of capitalism can be discerned. It is produced. It is a 
product of power. It is a functional aspect of capitalism and neoliberal capitalism in 
particular because it spurs people to continue to invest more, to try more, to try harder, 
when this will not necessarily produce the desired results. Because freedom is a process, 
not a state of being.
The point to be taken from this is that the freedom offered by neoliberal capitalism in 
America is limited, and this freedom is not devoid of power. Neoliberal capitalism 
constitutes a specific paradox in which power appears less constraining and more 
liberal, but in its ambit, more totalising, as the position of the individual is societally 
understood to result from merit, human capital, ultimately oneself, which takes no 
recognition of societal position, or structures of limitations. This is a totalising 
argument, which makes the claim that we are ultimately not free in the freedom of 
neoliberal capitalism, which holds politically devastating implications. Under this line 
of reasoning, anxiety is a product of power. It is the psychological effect of power. And 
in this regard, we return to the argument developed by Bell. He noted the state of 
anxiety that individuals felt in the 1960s, however he connected this to a lack of belief 
and thus inability to gain meaning. The paradox of neoliberal capitalism is that 
individuals can gain meaning in a plethora of ways. They can 'become' who they want 
to be. Their position in society is not determined, but malleable. But how individuals 
'become' is determined through the attainment of money and more of it. The belief that 
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individuals can 'become' through money is predicated on the system in which they 
reside. In this way, it is impossible to escape the market-induced epistemology of being 
a rational individual. Individuals are epistemologically constrained. For this reason, the 
reality of failure is always present in the fantasy of freedom and it is this near constant 
reminder from society, that stokes anxiety and thus spurs individuals forward to work 
harder, try more, be better, take risks. But doing these things only pushes them deeper 
into the wound that exists, a wound that is continually lacerated through self-infliction: 
you are not good enough, be better, try harder, take risks. The individualism that the 
market creates is totalising, it is inescapable and thus devastating. 
♦
Does this mark the end of our investigation? Can we conclude that American 
individuals are all manipulated by the system in which they reside? Or, by identifying 
this position-- knowing that they (collectively, not individually) exist in this manner--
can hope or energy not be drawn to change what appears to be the only way? The 
question on which this thesis will end, and ultimately, inevitably will leave unanswered, 
is whether this plastic cage is impenetrable and totalising. Having discerned the 
processes that are taking place perhaps it is possible to identify a way out. The 
recognition of the problem is the first step towards transformative change. This thesis 
finally makes the claim that agency exists when there is no choice but for change to 
come. In this regard, it is not a matter of whether individuals have the capacity to pick 
or choose what they want and who they are, but rather, when they recognise that this is 
not a choice afforded to them, it is this recognition which fosters resentment, anger and 
action. This thesis elucidates a very philosophical understanding of agency, through an 
understanding of how subjectivity is produced and how this subjectivity limits 
substantive advancement. Certainly, it has been the task of radical scholars of the past to 
determine how change can be driven. Is it through the revolution of the working class, 
the uprising of peasants, students, women? The author does not have the answer, or 
rather does not believe that change will be so cut and dry. She is hopeful that another 
world is possible, so long as the subjectivity of neoliberal capitalism can be shattered. 
Recognition is the first step. 
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Conclusion
The story that this thesis tells is a story about power, and how power exists through the 
common sense understandings of life. This story is told through an analysis of money 
and freedom in America. It is not a simple story, told as if individuals are determined 
from above as though they are drones of class. But neither is it an emancipatory tale of 
individuals pursuing freedom and money because that is what they inherently desire. 
The story that is told centres on the founding narrative of America as a free nation 
defined by opportunity. The distinct path that this founding narrative set in place 
presents money as the zenith of freedom, self-realisation and the ultimate expression of 
national character. It is a self-reinforcing tale: freedom is required to obtain money to 
further obtain freedom, to become an American. And the process goes on. In this sense 
money holds a symbolic power greater than its common sense understanding as a 
medium of exchange. Money is freedom; money is social power. This ultimately holds a 
devastating function of entrenchment, from which individuals cannot escape.
Chapter one indicated that this belief in money – the belief that money provides social 
power – is systemically constructed. This claim is reached through a critical 
investigation of neoclassical economic theory which negates all social aspects of money. 
And recognising the epistemological and methodological limitations of current critical 
understandings of money served to open the thesis to the general problematic of 
subjectivity and power. 
 Chapter two outlines that this belief is connected to the historical relationship between 
capitalism and religion indicated by Weber. It holds that religion and belief are 
inextricable parts of capitalism. This challenges the common story of secularisation and 
recognises that the secular individualism of modern capitalism has a moral base. The 
chapter suggests rather tautologically that the secular belief of modern capitalism is not-
not a religion. By identifying this secular belief akin to a religion serves to indicate that 
power exists in modern capitalism. This indicates that the secular individualism of 
modern America is a product of power and because of this it requires critical analysis. 
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Chapter three draws upon the theoretical and conceptual insights of the previous 
chapters to indicate a more complex tale of the rise of neoliberal capitalism. It indicates 
that the realisation of the neoliberal period was not occasioned by the imposition of 
monetarist economic theory onto the American society. There was significant popular 
discontent with the state of the nation which created and further came to legitimate 
neoliberal discourses about individualism and freedom. This historical analysis is 
important because it lays the foundation to better understand the continuation of 
neoliberalism.
Chapter four indicated how people have become bound within the system of neoliberal 
capitalism through the 'freedom' that it provides. It holds that freedom is a constructed 
notion. And it is this construction of freedom through an understanding of non-freedom 
that serves to entrench people in the system of capitalism. Neoliberal capitalism is 
distinct from capitalism because people feel more involved in the process of it. They 
cannot remove themselves from it. They are bound within it. They are not workers but 
entrepreneurs. They are not producers, but consumers. They do not reside in the 
collective: they are individuals. It is the belief in what it means to be American, the 
discipline of the market and the self-discipline of the individual which keeps this 
narrative alive. Anxiety is recognised to be a productive part of neoliberal capitalism 
because it spurs individuals to be 'become' the individual that the market requires. This 
thesis thus provides the ability to understand or at least discern the limits of subjectivity. 
It investigates the modern forms of power that pervade neoliberal society while 
recognising that structural power remains in existence.
This thesis provides a new understanding of subjectivity because it gives Marxist 
analysis a Foucauldian accent. It attempts to make structuralist and post-structuralist 
thought productive, rather than antagonistic. The conclusion that this thesis reaches, is 
that the American individual, the subject of neoliberalism, is bound within a 
traumatising state. They are freedom-loving and liberty-seeking, just as the nation was 
founded. But in this desire for freedom and the further attainment of it through 
possession of money, they are also anxious. This anxiety is entrenched within their 
character structure, precisely because of the way that society is structured and the fact 
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that freedom is not possible for all. It is in recognition of this disjuncture between the 
limits of reality and the fantasy of freedom that agency can be inscribed into a subject 
for another world. 
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